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This dissertation offers a new approach to the works of the contemporary Russian writer 
Viktor Pelevin: from the perspective of posthumanism. Trans-/posthumanism is a salient trend 
stimulated by the techno-scientific advance and the resulting benefits of a disembodied 
condition. It seeks to redefine the notion of human and thus move away from the 
predominantly anthropocentric to a more inclusive posthuman society. I argue in my 
dissertation that such an approach makes it possible to reconcile the divergences in the 
existing critical reviews of Pelevin’s works because it illustrates how defying literary 
convention is, in itself, an artistic method aimed at developing a philosophical message. 
Merging the conventions of both ‘high’ and ‘mass’ literature and creating fluid imaginary 
realities in his works, Pelevin transcends the boundaries of literary form and thus illustrates 
the concept of disembodiment through his recurring theme of nothingness – ‘pustota’.  
 
Pelevin experiments with the possibilities of transhumanism in two domains: genre and 
character. This research, therefore, looks at the ways he takes the notion of disembodiment to 
its extreme; it then analyses the philosophical message that these techniques help him to 
convey. By exposing the limitations of the human body and mind, the author topples the 
human being from his superior position, thus creating a case for a new, posthumanist vision. It 
is structured according to the disembodied experiences of the characters - perceiving life 
through instinct, intellect, and intuition – to better illustrate his key philosophical message. 
The dissertation mainly focuses on his writing from 1999 which marks his growing 
engagement with the theme: Generation П (1999); Sviashchennaia kniga oborotnia (2004); 
Empire V/Batman Apollo duology (2006/2013); t (2009); Ananasnaia voda dla prekrasnoi 
damy (2010), S.N.U.F.F. (2011), iPhuck10 (2017), and Tainye vidy na goru Fudzi (2018). It, 






I would like to thank my supervisor, Dr Rajendra Chitnis, for his continued support and 




I declare that the work in this dissertation was carried out in accordance with the requirements 
of the University's Regulations and Code of Practice for Research Degree Programmes and 
that it has not been submitted for any other academic award. Except where indicated by 
specific reference in the text, the work is the candidate's own work. Work done in 
collaboration with, or with the assistance of, others, is indicated as such. Any views expressed 
in the dissertation are those of the author. 
 
SIGNED: .............................................................  DATE:.......................... 
 
 5 
Note on transliteration and references 
I have used the Simplified Library of Congress transliterating style without diacritics; I have 
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The dissertation offers a new approach to interpreting the works of Viktor Pelevin: from the 
perspective of posthumanism. Viktor Pelevin is a prolific author, active on the Russian 
literary scene since 1989, whom critics frequently, though not exclusively, associate with 
Russian postmodernism. His oeuvre, spanning almost three decades now, not only represents 
a record of his generation’s tumultuous socio-cultural history but also offers diverse material 
for a multi-disciplinary analysis.  
Scholars have extensively analysed Pelevin’s works in the context of postmodernism, 
conceptualism, Buddhism, and mythology but until now there has not been a consistent 
analysis of them from the perspective of posthumanism. Thus Kornev, 1  Minkevich, 2 
Stepanan3 view Pelevin in largely postmodern terms, pointing to the ‘multi-layered’ character 
of his texts, pastiche of genres, intertextuality; Genis4 detects an almost cinematic ‘collage of 
meanings and ideas’ conveyed both in the foreground and the mise-en-scène. Lipovetskii and 
Genis take this postmodern reading of Pelevin’s works deeper and analyse him within the 
conceptualist aesthetics that focuses on the idea rather than the form of a work of art. There is 
a tendency among the Russian critics to view Pelevin through the prism of Moscow 
conceptualism. Its main distinction from Western conceptualism was outlined by Ilia 
Kabakov and quoted by Lipovetskii in his article: ‘вещь заменяется не на другую вещь и 
даже не на описание, имеющее какой-то конкретный смысл […] а на пустоту из-за 
тотальной обесцененности реальности (как ‘вещной’, так и словесной)’.5 But Pelevin as 
an artist does not merely deconstruct reality, he creates a conceptual work of art by 
rearranging it through simulacra of reality: ‘Пелевин упорно доказывал, что из симулякров 
и фикций можно заново построить реальность’.6 This interpretation resonates with Genis’s 
vision of Pelevin’s conceptualism: ‘Попав в систему отражений, реальность нашего 
 
 The title of the dissertation makes reference to Ray Kurzweil’s book The Age of Spiritual Machines: When 
Computers Exceed Human Intelligence (New York: Viking Press, 1999). 
1 Sergei Kornev, ‘Stolknovenie pustot: mozhet li postmodernizm byt russkim ili klasicheskim? Ob odnoi 
avanture Viktora Pelevina’, Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 28 (1997), 244-59 (p.250). 
2 Andrei Minkevich, ‘Pokolenie Pelevina’, Russkaia gazeta, 2001, <www.russ.ru/krug/99-04-08/minkev.htm> 
[accessed 18 September 2019] 
3 Karen Stepanan, ‘Realizm kak spasenie ot snov’, Znama, 11,  (1996), 194-200 (p.195). 
4 Alexandr Genis, ‘Beseda desataia: Pole chudes. Viktor Pelevin’, Zvezda, 12 (1997), 230-33 (p.232). 
5 Mark Lipovetskii, ‘Kontseptualizm i neobarokko’, Nezavisimaia gazeta, 7 September 2000 
<http://www.ng.ru/%20kafedra/2000-09-07/3_postmodern.html> [accessed 18 September 2019] 
6 Mark Lipovetskii, ‘Goluboe salo pokoleniia, ili Dva mifa ob odnom krizise’, Znama, 11 (1999), 207-15 
(p.210). 
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бытия сходит на нет. […] Вымысел у Пелевина есть инструмент конструкции 
реальности’. 7  Kuritsyn draws a parallel with socialist art aesthetics and Pelevin’s 
conceptualism; he highlights the fake realities of the Soviet collective mind which existed 
through shared Soviet experience and belief but in fact were a simulacrum: ‘исток таких 
вполне постмодеpнистских миpов-симулякpов обнаpуживается в эстетике 
соцpеализма’.8 Western critics also commented on the aesthetics of emptiness and artifice of 
Pelevin’s constructed worlds. Dalton-Brown points to the ‘ludic’, playfully superficial nature 
of his texts, comparing them with comic-books and pop-art: ‘The texts reveal themselves for 
what they really are: comic-book reflections of the world. This is pop-art which, like Warhol's 
or Lichtenstein's pictures, offers its own images as ridiculously sacred, yet it is pop-art told 
with a Nabokovian artistry which delights’.9 Thus, the key feature of Pelevin’s conceptualism, 
as seen both by Russian and Western critics and scholars, is an array of constructed realities 
that, in their multiplicity and through his break from aesthetic conventions, deconstruct 
cultural codes, thus revealing the ultimate and abject void. 
Demythologisation in Pelevin’s earlier works is commonly viewed by critics with 
reference to Soviet ideology and the later collapse of the Soviet Union that brought about 
confusion in the collective minds of the early post-Soviet generation, i.e. leaving an abject 
void. Noordenbos offers an unconventional analysis of deconstruction and the trope of the 
void in Pelevin’s novel Chapaev i Pustota. The scholar interprets the fragmented structure of 
the first-person narrative with ‘blank spaces’ of consciousness and history as representations 
of traumatic confustion, collective ‘disorientation produced by political upheaval’ and failed 
‘attempts to piece together the disparate parts of Russia’s twentieth-century past’. 10  The 
researcher develops his reasoning from his interpretation of the familiar image of the black 
bagel. 11  According to Noordenbos, the plot of the novel loops around the black hole of 
Russia’s traumatised history and the hole, therefore, represents typical symptoms of the 
trauma: emptiness, amnesia, and hollowed out identity.  
 
7 Aleksandr Genis, ‘Fenomen Pelevina’, http://www.svoboda. org/programs/otb/1999/obt.02.shtm [accessed 18 
September 2019] 
8 Vacheslav Kuritsyn, ‘Kontseptualizm i sotsart: tela i nostalgii’, Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2 (1998), 306-
10, p.308. 
9 Sally Dalton-Brown, ‘Ludic Nonchalance or Ludicrous Despair? Viktor Pelevin and Russian Postmodernist 
Prose’, Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 75, No. 2 (April 1997), 216-233, p.227. 
10 Boris Noordenbos, ‘Shocking Histories and Missing Memories: Trauma in Viktor Pelevin's Čapaev i Pustota’, 
Russian Literature Vol. 85 (October 2016), 43-68, p.49. 
11 ‘Black bagel’ is a pun based on several meanings: the Russian idiom ‘дырка от бублика’ for something 
futile, i.e. a void; the Zen Buddhist circle symbolising both enlightenment and the void. 
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In the context of Pelevin’s deconstruction of aesthetic conventions, most scholars and 
critics, despite diverging on the issue of postmodernism in Pelevin, point to the specific 
nature of his deconstructions – self-referential, self-ironic, and polymorphic. Thus, Vicks 
coins the term ‘déjà vu postmodernism’ in relation to his work. According to her definition, 
‘Déjà vu postmodernism is postmodernism so familiar that it becomes a pseudo-mythologised 
condition experienced as a rerun. Enacting deja-vu postmodernism, Pelevin’s novels 
deconstruct themselves as literary art… and they depict post-Soviet culture as both created by 
a void and as essentially nothing itself’.12 Vicks uses the example of Generation П, which 
positions itself as a cynical product, as ‘literature that is “not-literature”’, and contends that 
the role of Russian literature in society has been ‘degraded to nothing’.13 This view resonates 
with Hutchings’s conclusion in his analysis of the same novel that postmodernist ‘Pelevin 
enacts the end of literature’ in the age of the highly commodified camera.14  
The above perspectives on Pelevin’s postmodern deconstruction redefine the role of 
contemporary literature and authorship, a subject of great debate among scholars. As viewed 
by Dalton-Brown in her analysis of t (2009), ‘Pelevin’s powerful ‘action-man’ t is a means of 
introducing the theme of authorial impotence’. 15  This view of authorship correlates with 
Docherty’s analysis of the notion of ‘postmodern character’ that is also dominated by 
‘disappearance’ of the author: ‘… character never is, but is always about-to-be, endlessly 
deferred, fragmented, elusive, less an epistemological conundrum than an ontological one in 
terms of which the fictionality of the characters (and text) can be called into question’.16  
Such a vision of authorship and literature correlates with Pelevin’s poetics which is best 
characterised by fluidity and elusiveness of fragmented reality in an abject void of subjective 
existence. The polymorphic nature of his writing accounts for another perspective from which 
his works were commonly viewed: Buddhism. Kornev links Pelevin’s deconstruction of 
external reality with the Buddhist method of liberation of the mind from clinging and 
passions. Similarly, he applies the Buddhist concept of ‘no-self’ to the interpretation of the 
trope of emptiness, void, nothingness. By discarding norms, prejudice and grand narratives a 
person can accept the transience of life and finite nature of physical form, which resonates 
 
12 Meghan Vicks, Narratives of Nothing in 20th-Century Literature (Bloomsbury, 2015), p.151. 
13 Ibid., p.153. 
14 Stephen Hutchings, Russian Literary Culture in the Camera Age: The Word as Image (Routledge, 2004), 
p.177. 
15 Sally Dalton-Brown, ‘Looking for the Creator: Pelevin and the Impotent Writer in T (2009) and Ananasnaia 
voda dlia prekrasnoi damy (2011)’, Modern Language Review Vol. 109 (2014), 199-218, p.200. 
16  Thomas Docherty, ‘Postmodern Characterization: The Ethics of Alterity’, in Postmodernism and 
Contemporary Fiction, ed. by E. Smyth (London: Batsford, 1991), 169–88 (pp. 169, 172). 
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with classical Buddhism: ‘как говорят специалисты, все, что он делает, и буквально и по 
духу вполне укладывается в ортодоксальную традицию Махаяны’.17 Other critics, too, 
draw a parallel between Buddhism/Zen-Buddhism and some of Pelevin’s literary methods: 
‘Пелевин использует один из распространенных приемов японской дзен-буддистской 
поэзии – хонкадори, что означает включение в свой текст чужого текста или 
определенных фрагментов…’. 18  Kuznetsov interprets Pelevin’s symbolism of emptiness 
from the Buddhist perspective and treats this recurring theme of notingness as an allegorical 
explanation of the essence of Buddhism: ‘Можно назвать это “двойным кодированием”… 
но лучше увидеть в этом следование буддистской традиции, в которой сожжение 
мастером статуи Будды служит лучшим объяснением сущности буддизма’.19 
This brief overview illustrates the diversity of critical approaches to Pelevin’s writing 
and also reveals a common feature present in all the studies – perpetual emptiness as the 
prerequisite condition for transcendence and creation of new forms that are equally transient. 
This condition appears to underpin the transhumanist aesthetics and the resulting 
posthumanist vision. The nature of our twenty-first-century condition creates the need for a 
consistent approach to contemporary literature through the prism of posthuman thought. As 
McQuillen and Vaingurt demonstrate in The Human Reimagined, today it is difficult ‘to draw 
discreet [sic] boundaries between nature, technology and humanity’ because of ‘continuous 
cyborgisation and prosthetisation of the body, the technologization of reproductive practices 
[…], the rapidly growing sophistication of artificial intelligence machines, and the increasing 
presence and influence of digital environments and virtual spaces in daily life and identity 
formation’.20 In the light of these fundamental changes, the traditional humanist discourse 
with its inherent anthropocentrism needs to be redefined relative to the deep technological and 
epistemological shifts of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.  
Pelevin’s writing, especially the poetics and philosophy of his later works, reflects these 
changes. As a chronicler of his generation, Pelevin focuses on contemporary socio-cultural 
context, critically observing a trajectory of social and cultural change in society. His works, 
therefore, have evolved thematically over time to reflect recent advances in science and 
technology. He has always been interested in scientific and technological possibilities, 
referring to cutting-edge technologies, aspects of quantum physics or IT, and scientists 
 
17 Kornev, Ibid., p.251. 
18 Aleksandr Zakurenko, ‘Iskomaia pustota’, Literaturnoe obozrenie, 3 (1998), 93-6 (p.95).   
19 Sergei Kuznetsov, ‘Vasilii Ivanovich Chapaev na puti voina’, Kommersant, 27 June 1996, p.13. 
20 Colleen McQuillen, Julia Vaingurt, The Human Reimagined: Posthumanism in Russia (Cultural Revolutions: 
Russia in the Twentieth Century), (Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2018), p.7. 
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working in the fields associated with posthumanism. His texts thus give multiple imaginative 
interpretations of ‘singularity’ (physics); computationism and biorobotics (Dennet and 
Chandler, AI and the human brain). Besides, in literary criticism and scholarship the image of 
emptiness, abyss, void has been invariably addressed as a typical feature of Pelevin’s writing 
style. This recurring trope of his works strongly resonates with the notion of disembodiment 
which is the key concept of posthumanism. Emptiness, as pointed out earlier, also resonates 
with the notion of ‘no-self’ in Buddhism and is part of a broader perspective that treats all 
living matter as a transient flow of energy. In fact, emptiness and transience appear to be 
common features shared by transhumanism and Buddhism, despite their very different 
epistemological systems. A prominent advocate of democratic transhumanism, James 
Hughes, commented on this similarity in 2006 in an online interview:  
 
Buddhism is a faith tradition and set of spiritual practices whose core idea is that human beings can 
become more than human by application of mental technology and self-discipline. As such it is 
probably the most compatible of the older faiths with transhumanism […] in its insistence that 
there is no discrete, continuous ego that could be protected and perpetuated. […] I think we will 
increasingly see the truth of the emptiness of the self as we apply neurotechnologies and life 
extension.21 
 
My analysis, however, focuses on transhumanism and therefore does not attempt a detailed 
Buddhist reading of Pelevin. But this similarity is important because it, as well as Pelevin’s 
references to latest scientific and technological realities, reveals his engagement with the topic 
of posthumanism and thus necessitates a new approach to his work. In my dissertation I will 
attempt a reading of his texts through transhumanist aesthetics and philosophy. Such an 
approach does not contradict the previous readings of Pelevin; in fact, it makes it possible to 
bring together the key features from existing literary criticism and scholarship in a uniform, 
consistent analysis. I will illustrate that, true to his style of ‘придумщик, фантазер […], 
сюжетчик’, 22  Pelevin engages with posthumanism not as its follower but rather as a 
developer of a new, posthumanist vision.  
 Livers has read S.N.U.F.F. (2011) from the perspective of humanism-versus-
posthumanism. The key ethical framework on which the scholar builds his reasoning is ‘the 
 
21 James Hughes, ‘Interview: Techno-social Changesurfer’, 13 June 2006. 
<http://ishush.blogspot.com/2006/06/interview-james-hughes-techno-social.html> [accessed 17 September 
2019] 
22 Sergei Chuprinin, ‘Sbyvsheesa nesbyvsheesa: liberalnyi vzglad na sovremennuiu literaturu’, Znama, 9 
(1993), 181-88 (p.182). 
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gradual opening of the self to cultural and ontological others’.23 He analyses how the novel 
deconstructs traditional humanist taxonomies that privilege humanity and exclude ‘the Other’ 
in order to lay the foundation for the posthumanist ethics of confluence, acceptance and 
‘humility in the face of the Other’. 24  Livers contends that the author achieves this by 
dismantling the privileged position of ‘embodied consciousness’ of man and equating it with 
the ‘disembodied self-awareness of artificial intelligence’. 25  Livers’s study is a vivid 
illustration of the need to apply a consistent posthumanist perspective to contemporary 
literature. And this is what I intend to achieve in my analysis of Pelevin’s oeuvre, treating his 
works as a single narrative that heralds a new, posthumanist, vision.   
The term posthumanism needs to be defined and placed within the relevant academic 
context. Today there are two terms – transhumanism and posthumanism - often used 
interchangeably. However, there is a growing tendency in scholarship to distinguish between 
the two. According to Bostrom26, one of the key scholars of transhumanism and co-founder of 
The World Transhumanist Association (1998), the term ‘transhumanism’ was introduced by 
Julian Huxley, a distinguished biologist and the brother of the writer Aldous Huxley. In his 
book Religion Without Revelation, Julian focused on the scientific potential for metaphysical 
transcendence of the human form:  
The human species can, if it wishes, transcend itself – not just sporadically, … but in its entirety, as 
humanity. We need a name for this new belief. Perhaps transhumanism will serve: man remaining 
man, but transcending himself, by realizing new possibilities of and for his human nature. 27  
The use of ‘posthumanism’ as a term is traced back to Ihab Hassan, a literary figure 
preoccupied with the postmodern condition, who in the late 70s wrote about the end of the era 
of humanism in its current form and emphasised the need to redefine the nature and role of 
the human being. He wrote: ‘We need first to understand that the human form – including the 
human desire and all its external representations – may be changing radically and thus must 
 
23 Keith Livers, ‘Is There Humanity In Posthumanity? Viktor Pelevin’s S.N.U.F.F.’, Slavic and East European 
Journal no. 3 (Fall 2018), special issue ‘Twenty Years After Chapaev and the Void: Viktor Pelevin, Then, and 
Now’, 503-522 (p.507). 
24 Emmanuel Levinas, ‘What No One Else Can Do In My Place: A Conversation with Emmanuel Levinas’, In 
Religion: A Concept, ed. Hent de Vries (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), p.300.  
25 Livers, Ibid., p.516. 
26 Nick Bostrom, ‘A History of Transhumanist Thought’, Journal of Evolution and Technology, Vol.14 (1), 
April 2005, 15-67 (p.58). 
27 Julian Huxley, Religion without revelation (London: E. Benn, 1927), p.24. 
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be revisioned’. 28  These lines reiterate the central tenet of posthumanists: the end of 
anthropocentrism and the start of a new epoch that celebrates equal status of other forms 
alongside the human. Posthumanism therefore recognises that a human being is one of the 
multiple representations of life and is not isolated from other beings in the constant flux of 
matter.   
Both transhumanism and posthumanism are preoccupied with the disembodied human 
condition, a focus shared with cosmism that developed as a movement in the early twentieth-
century stimulated by achievements in physics. Both focus on the ways and consequences of 
transcending the traditional physical boundaries. Some cosmologists, such as Russian 
biocosmist Konstantin Tsiolkovskii or philosopher and futurologist Nikolai Fedorov, even 
tried to link their scientific views with mythological or esoteric teachings. Fedorov tried to 
synthesise Orthodox religion and science, looking at ways for humans to achieve immortality 
by assembling dispersed molecules and atoms in order to overcome mortality, of which he 
wrote: ‘[к]ак ни глубоки причины смертности, смертность не изначальна’ (e.g. ‘O 
smertnosti’). 29  Tsiolkovskii used similar imagery when he described a human as 
‘государство’ ‘бессмертны[х] атом[ов]’.30 Regardless of the esoteric component of their 
specific theories, it is essential to point out to their understanding of a human being as a form 
of larger matter and part of the universe that is controlled by yet undiscovered laws. This 
approach to the universe resonates with Pelevin’s imagery: ‘Все на свете было сделано из 
одной и той же субстанции. И этой субстанцией был я сам’.31  
However, there is a broad gap between transhumanism and posthumanism with regard 
to their perspectives on the humanist ethos. According to Ranisch and Sorgner, while the 
narrative in both transhumanism and posthumanism moves ‘beyond humanism’, their key 
difference is in diverging philosophical perspectives on the role and position of the human 
being. 32 Thus, transhumanism can be viewed as ‘an intensification of humanism’, since it 
retains the humanist anthropocentrism and strives for progress and self-perfection of the 
humankind enhanced by scientific and technological advances.33 The main caveat is therefore 
 
28 Ihab Hassan, ‘Prometheus as Performer: Toward a Posthumanist Culture?’, Georgia Review, 1977, Vol.31 
(4), 830–850, p.843. 
29 Nikolai F. Fedorov, ‘O smertnosti’ in Collection of Writings in 4 volumes, ed. by Ivan I. Blauberg (Moscow: 
Progress-Traditsia, Evidentis, 1995—2004), pp.200-01 (p.200). 
30 Konstantin Tsiolkovskii, Vola vselennoi: neizvestnye razumnye sily (Kaluga, 1928). 
31 Viktor Pelevin, Ampir V (Moscow: Eksmo, 2006), p.240. 
32 Stefan L. Sorgner, Post- and Transhumanism: An Introduction, ed. by Robert Ranisch and Stefan L. Sorgner 
(Frankfurt-am-Main: Peter Lang, 2014), p.1. 
33 Ibid., p.10. 
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‘that humans should take evolution in their own hands and undertake broad-scale attempts to 
incorporate technologies into their lives’.34  
In popular culture transhumanism (or ‘pop posthumanism’, according to Nayar)35 refers 
to a wide range of artistic tools used to create transhuman characters in a sci-fi narrative. 
Posthumanism, however, positions itself as ‘a break’ from humanist ideals; it questions 
‘traditional concepts of the human and criticis[es] the idea that “man is the measure of all 
things”’.36 Such a distinction is in line with More’s definition of posthumanism: 
   
Philosophies of life that seek the continuation and acceleration of the evolution of intelligent life 
beyond its currently human form and human limitations by means of science and technology, 
guided by life-promoting principles and values. 37  
 
Thus, posthumanism is concerned with social, political, and philosophical aspects of the 
change in human physicality leading to a breakthrough in cognition, perception, and morality. 
In his book Posthumanism Nayar presents his own conceptual system; he believes 
posthumanism should be ‘critical’ of the existing dominance of man and should ‘call for a 
more inclusive definition of life, and a greater moral-ethical response, and responsibility, to 
non-human life forms in the age of species blurring and species mixing. … [I]t interrogates 
the hierarchic ordering – and subsequently exploitation and even eradication – of life 
forms’.38  
In this dissertation, to ensure consistency of approach, I will apply the term 
transhumanism to Pelevin’s artistic methods in order to show how he uses it as a literary tool 
to explore the various aspects of the disembodied condition. He transcends the boundaries of 
this condition by creating non-human characters and experimenting with the genre forms. I 
will also analyse how this literary tool helps the author convey complex metaphysical ideas 
about the nature and source of life, the self in its relation to the world, and how these ideas are 
redefined in the context of transhumanism. This methodology will then show that his 
philosophical exploration of the disembodied condition resonates with the non-
anthropocentric focus of posthumanism. Therefore, the term posthumanism in this research 
 
34 Ibid., p.13. 
35 Pramod Nayar, Posthumanism (Cambridge: Polity, 2014), pp.8–9. 
36 Ranisch and Sorgner, p.16. 
37  Max More, ‘Transhumanism: Towards a Futurist Philosophy’, Extropy, 6 (summer 1990), 6-12, 
<http://www.maxmore.com/transhum.htm> [accessed 23 May 2019] 
38 Nayar, p.9. 
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will be used in the context of Pelevin’s philosophical argument. I will trace how the 
posthumanist perspective in Pelevin’s works topples the human being from his self-
proclaimed superior position and creates a need to integrate our species into the 
heterogeneous but interconnected multiplicity of all other sentient and non-sentient beings.  
The disembodied condition of the transhumanist context suggests a key concept that is 
essential to Pelevin’s argument – transcendence of physical form – that, in its turn implies 
changeable and heterogeneous multiplicity of modified forms. The Transhumanist 
Declaration 39  stipulates the equality of all ‘modified’ life forms and artificial intellects. 
Reading Pelevin through the prism of transhumanism, we can expand the semantic boundaries 
of physical form to include literary form. This feature of Pelevin’s writing was discussed in 
the context of postmodernism (see above reviews). Transcendence therefore can imply 
modification of the literary form, including the genre. Modification, in the transhumanist 
context, can be synonymous with mutation. In fact, that is how some researchers refer to 
postmodern writing of the twentieth- twenty-first centuries: Skoropanova refers to it as 
‘mutation of the genres’. 40  So, from an artistic point of view, in Pelevin’s fiction 
transhumanism as a literary method is used to transcend the form at two levels – to modify 
existing genre conventions and to experiment with the forms in which his characters exist in 
fictional realities.  
Genres are dynamic, constantly evolving forms, and existing scholarship in literary 
criticism reveals a diversity of their definitions. However, this dissertation is not a study of 
genres, that is why Pelevin’s texts are analysed only relative to commonly accepted genre 
conventions as presented in dictionaries of literary terms (e.g. in Barnet in 196441, and later in 
Cuddon 199842). The key point of this overview is to show how transcending the form works 
towards a posthumanist argument. Pelevin does not fit into any specific genre convention; his 
texts incorporate features of fable, fairy tale, science fiction, Gothic, detective, satire, socio-
philosophical novel, and have elements of bildungsroman. Works such as ‘Zatvornik i 
Shestipalyi’ (1990), Zhizn nasekomykh (1993), or Sviashchennaia kniga oborotnia (2004) are 
often referred to as fables, with characters being allegorical animal representations of humans 
 
39 Nick Bostrom, Max More, et al, “Transhumanist declaration’, Humanity+ Board (2009) 
<https://humanityplus.org/philosophy/transhumanist-declaration/> [accessed 25 May 2019] 
40 Irina S. Skoropanova, Russkaia postmodernistskaia literatura: Novaia filosofia, novyi iazyk  (Moscow: Flinta 
nauka, 2007), p.58. 
41 Sylvan Barnet, A Dictionary of Literary Terms (London: Constable, 1964). 
42 John Anthony Cuddon, A Dictionary of Literary Terms and Literary Theory (London: Wiley, 1998). 
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used by the author to convey a moral message. Genis believes that in Zhizn nasekomykh the 
author re-evaluates and adds a different ring to Krylov’s ‘Strekoza i Muravei’ (1808):  
 
[Пелевин] рассказывает переведенную на язык мыльной оперы историю ‘муравья’, который 
захотел стать ‘стрекозой’. […] Обращаясь к хрестоматийному сюжету, Пелевин его не 
пересказывает и не пародирует, а переосмысливает, добавляя свою мораль к старой басне.43 
 
This definition is based on the trait of anthropomorphising animal characters in the books but 
does not take account of authorial intent, which in Pelevin’s works, unlike a traditional fable, 
is hardly to moralise. In fact, as discussed above, he tries to remove himself from the narrative 
as an author; in iPhuck10 he even takes this technique to its extreme and markets the novel as 
a creation of an algorithm. Besides, as he admitted in an interview to Rossiiskaia gazeta in 
2005: ‘[…] я не считаю своей функцией воспитание читателя - этим должны заниматься 
телевидение и прокуратура’.44 These considerations yet again point to the hybrid nature of 
Pelevin’s writing style.      
Another genre with which some of Pelevin’s novels are associated is the Gothic novel. 
Taking only character archetypes as the basis for classification, we can name his duology 
Ampir V (2006) and Batman Apollo (2013) as the most vivid examples, with vampire 
creatures dominating the world. Even though some of the traits of a Gothic novel are 
deliberately included as a literary experiment (e.g. vampire protagonists and their miraculous 
abilities), these hardly follow the grim, scary Gothic narrative with the themes of forbidden 
love, yearning, and alienation of the character as ‘the Other’. The Gothic appears to be present 
only superficially, as an external form. So some scholars and critics use these incongruities to 
refer to Pelevin’s works as fairy tales: ‘В своих книгах Пелевин все чаще […] использует 
образы героев и сюжеты из сказок. Можно упомянуть Красную Шапочку, Крошечку-
Хаврошечку и многие другие. […] Вообще жанр философской сказки – это подходящая 
форма говорить о серьезных вещах без излишнего морализаторства, пафоса и 
патетики’.45 I would argue, however, if we can still talk of specific prose forms in twentieth- 
and twenty-first-century writing, a fairy tale narrative does not have satire at its core, while 
Pelevin’s texts have at least some element of it.  
 
43 Aleksandr Genis, ‘Viktor Pelevin: granitsy i metamorfozy’, Znama, 12 (1995), 210-214 (p.212). 
44 Viktor Pelevin in an interview to Mikhail Osin, ‘Avtor eto sadovnik sobstvennogo romana’, Rossiiskaia 
gazeta, 3770, 14 May 2005 <https://rg.ru/2005/05/14/pelevin.html> [accessed 1- September 2019] 
45 Stanislav Gurin, ‘Pelevin mezhdu Buddizmom i khristianstvom’, Topos, 24 April 2018.  
<http://Znam’a.topos.ru/article/ontologicheskie-progulki/pelevin-mezhdu-buddizmom-i-hristianstvom> 
[accessed 23 May 2019] 
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Moving on to the parallel between Pelevin’s works and science fiction, his most overtly 
sci-fi novels – Generation П (1999), S.N.U.F.F. (2011), iPhuck10 (2017) - would not fit 
within any of the diverse common definitions of the genre. Pelevin’s novels do not focus on 
what Asimov describes as ‘the reaction of human beings to changes in science and 
technology’,46 they incorporate these changes into the setting. Nor are his books a mere 
‘realistic speculation about possible future events’, 47 as Heinlein characterises science fiction. 
Shippey’s definition of science fiction does seem to include S.N.U.F.F. and iPhuck10, as they 
both have the ‘novum’,48 which he defined as ‘a discrete piece of information recognizable as 
not-true, but also as not-unlike-true, not-flatly- (and in the current state of knowledge) 
impossible’. But in the broader narrative this definition does not work either. Pelevin appears 
to borrow the form, the general concept of a particular genre, which he then transcends, thus 
emphasising the broad scope of the concept of disembodiment (applied to his literary 
method). This pastiche of genres resonates with what some critics referred to as ‘multilayered 
narrative’, ‘collage’, ‘genre mutation’ as features of postmodern literature (see above). At the 
same time Pelevin transcends the conventions of postmodernism too, as evidenced in 
scholarship and critical reviews of his works. For example, Genis, Ivanova, Bogdanova 
separately pointed out Pelevin’s non-conformity with the postmodern tradition. Ivanova refers 
him to a group of writers that have ‘overcome postmodernism’ (‘преодолевшие 
постмодернизм’).49 Bogdanova contends that, unlike writers who deconstruct everything in a 
sweeping postmodern nihilist urge, Pelevin tends to acknowledge some values which he 
shows as forgotten by society. This vision is similar to Genis’s idea that Pelevin creates new 
realities and even philosophies. Their respective reviews will be looked into in more detail 
later in the dissertation.  
In an attempt to fit Pelevin (and other not quite postmodern writers) within a literary 
canon some scholars and critics coined new terms, such as ‘turborealism’ or 
‘transmetarealism’ to refer to authors who have ‘overcome postmodernism’. What the terms 
have in common seems to emphasise the above argument about Pelevin’s literary method of 
transcending literary convention. They both are applied to intellectual science fiction that has 
a metaphorical narrative, a philosophical message at multiple levels, and creates multiple and 
 
46 Isaac Asimov, ‘How Easy to See the Future!’, Natural History, April 1975, p.62. 
47  Robert A. Heinlein, ‘Science Fiction: Its Nature, Faults and Virtues’ in The Science Fiction Novel: 
Imagination and Social Criticism, ed. by Earl Kemp and Basil Davenport (University of Chicago: Advent 
Publishers, 1959), p.22. 
48 Thomas A. Shippey, ‘The Hegemonic Novum’, Times Literary Supplement, 9 May 1980, p.519. 
49 Natalia Ivanova, ‘Preodolevshie postmodernizm’, Znama, 4 (1998), 193-204 (p.193). 
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dynamic realities that are treated freely in the text and develop what Berezhnoi calls a ‘meta-
religion’.50 Even though these terms – ‘turborealism’ and ‘transmetarealism’ – are not widely 
used in formal scholarship, they were included in Chuprinin’s 2007 published glossary of 
terms: ‘Russkaia literatura segodna. Zhizn po ponatiam’.51 
In the context of literary and genre conventions, of particular interest is the study by 
Hutchings who approaches Pelevin’s Generation П as ‘a metafiction which interrogates the 
status of literary tradition with which it is allied in the face of the threat posed by the 
commodified camera image’.52 In other words, the scholar takes Pelevin’s transcendence of 
the form to the transmedial level, beyond literature, likening his fiction to TV and advertising:  
 
Generation ‘P’ resembles a televisual anti-novel, interrupted by commercial breaks consisting of 
elaborate scenarios for adverts, extracts from a marketing handbook, Che Guevara’s tract, and 
Tatarskii’s ruminations on his mission to market the Russian Idea. Eventually, the entire novel 
emulates a television scenario.53 
 
Hutchings interprets the televisual, clip-like structure of the novel as a three-fold 
representation of finality: the apocalypse of the world, Russian literature, and ‘apocalypse as 
the precondition for final meaning’. 54  This conclusion yet again emphasises the non-
conformist, fluid nature of Pelevin’s metafiction and supports my initial premise. He 
transcends the convention of the genre and merges different forms, and even media together; 
this morphing becomes the definitive freedom of expression and serves the key message of all 
his works. According to Lipovetskii, this message boils down to being a ‘проповедь’ 
(sermon) ‘об отсутствии универсальных истин и об истинности иллюзий, как 
религиозно-философская утопия пустоты’.55 Similarly, in her study of Chapaev i Pustota 
(1996), Generation П (1999), and Sviashchennaia kniga oborotnia (2004), Vicks looks into 
the socio-political context that underpins her analysis of the master trope, the void, emerging 
from the bifurcated realities. To her, the image represents the total collapse of the previous 
order of things in the social collective inflicted by the collapse of the Soviet Union. In her 
 
50  Sergei Berezhnoi, ‘Vstupitelnaia stata’, in Russkaia fantastika d dvadtsatom veke v imenakh i litsakh: 
spravochnyi material (Russian 20th Century Science Fiction in Names and Faces: Reference Materials), ed. by 
Olga Vinogradova (Moscow: MegaTron, 1998), 5-23 (p.10). 
51 Sergei Chuprinin, Russkaia literatura segodna. Zhizn po ponatiam (Moscow: Vrema, 2007), pp.139-140. 
52 Hutchings, p.175. 
53 Hutchings, p.177. 
54 Ibid., p.175. 
55  Naum Leiderman, Mark Lipovetskii, Sovremennaia russkaia literatura: 1950-1990, 2 vols. (Moscow: 
Akademia, 2003), II, p.509. 
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study The Narratives of Nothing in 20th Century Literature, Vicks goes beyond the narrative 
of the original Russian text to demonstrate the all-embracing nature of his multiple bifurcated 
realities that coexist within the same entity. She refers the diverging translations of Chapaev i 
Pustota in the UK (The Clay Gun Machine) and USA (Buddha’s Little Finger), where the 
protagonist, Pyotr Pustota, appears as Peter Null in the former and Pyotr Voyd in the latter. 
Vicks thus concludes:  
 
… as Voyd/Null is the central character upon which these narratives are built, this indicates that 
these divergent narratives and the realities they depict are also generated by the void… The 
pblication of the same novel under two different titles therefore functions as a kind of publishing 
performance art that pushes the idea of bifurcated realities beyond the narrative confines of 
Chapaev and Void and into the actual world of Pelevin’s readers.56 
 
‘Utopia of emptiness’ as a theme strongly resonates with the disembodied transhumanist 
aesthetics in Pelevin’s fiction. As seen from the above literature review, to achieve this the 
author goes beyond the mere ‘mutation of the genres’ and builds a narrative that transcends 
cognitive, spatial and temporal limitations. He creates multiple fictional worlds, or what 
Bykov calls ‘множество параллельных миров’.57 Genis describes this multi-zone marginal 
universe in Pelevin’s reality in similar tones: 
 
Окружающий мир для Пелевина – это череда искусственных конструкций […]. Все эти 
миры не являются истинными, но и ложными их назвать нельзя […]. Пелевин […] обживает 
стыки между реальностями. […] одна картина мира, накладываясь на другую, создает 
третью, отличную от первых двух. […] он населяет свои тексты героями, обитающими сразу 
в двух мирах.58  
 
Pelevin’s protagonists exist in an array of quasi-realities as they morph through time and 
space beyond their physical forms, i.e. in the abyss. Examples of Pelevin’s emptiness are 
ample – from titles of his works (Chapaev i Pustota, 1996) to spatial-temporal lacunae in his 
story-lines, when conventional relationship between space and time is deconstructed and then 
re-assembled in multiple locations.  
 
56 Meghan Vicks, Narratives of Nothing in 20th-Century Literature (Bloomsbury, 2015), p.158. 
57 Dmitrii Bykov, ‘Pobeg v Mongoliu’, Literaturnaia gazeta, 29 May 1996, p.4. 
58 Aleksandr Genis, ‘Fenomen Pelevina’, http://pelevin.nov.ru/stati/o-gen1/1.html [accessed 16 June 2019] 
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Pelevin’s non-human characters, artificial or mutant – from sentient beings, like 
werewolves and vampires, to non-sentient robots - morph through fleeting moments and 
spaces and co-exist in different domains, like quantum particles orbiting their parallel 
universes. As they drift between work and home, like in ‘Prints Gosplana’, or exist in 
multiple realities never leaving a public toilet, like in ‘Devatyi son Very Pavlovny’, or as 
they travel between 1917 and 1990s, like in Chapaev i Pustota, – they not only transcend the 
physical laws of nature, but come to realise, or suspect, that in fact this is all happening within 
their own consciousness.59 Such a vision corresponds to Dalton-Brown’s interpretation of 
Pelevin’s main focus:  
Arguably, all Pelevin’s work, very broadly speaking, can be defined as focused on issues of 
consciousness, from the theme of manipulated perceptions in Generation ‘P’ (1999), or of 
fragmented self-awareness in Chisla (Numbers, 2004), of illusion in Sviashchennaia kniga 
oborotnia (The Sacred Book of the Werewolf, 2004), to that of self-referentially in his 2005 Shlem 
uzhasa (The Helmet of Horror).60   
According to Dalton-Brown, this feature of ‘fluidity and unexpectedness’, emphasising the 
‘endlessly transitional’ nature of Pelevin’s characters, stems from the author’s love of the 
game in the narrative: ‘…Pelevin invites the reader to enter the “game” of the text, and to 
discover that there is never any end to the game, never any return to “reality”, and no 
possibility of winning’.61 This fluid structure becomes an artistic device conveying a deeper 
meaning  - of constant ‘moving from the status of man as creator to man as created’.62 Dalton-
Brown concludes that the shifty, bodiless stylistics of the character and narrative structure 
represents human disempowerment in a consumerist era. While such a vision is certainly true, 
I would argue that fluidity and void in the narrative also resonate with the transhumanist 
aesthetics and thus have a broader aim. Transhumanist bodiless stylistics brings out the abject 
void in spatial-temporal relationships in the characters’ minds, thus also shifting the locus in 
the reader’s perception of reality. One of the aims of the method is to expose the reader, 
through the characters’ unconventional cognitive experiences, to revelatory new, 
 
59 Both ‘Prints Gosplana’ and ‘Dev’atyi son Very Pavlovny’ are included in Sinii fonar’ collection, 1991.  
60 Sally Dalton-Brown, ‘Illusion — Money — Illusion: Viktor Pelevin and the 'Closed Loop' of the Vampire 
Novel’, Slavonica, Vol.17, No. 1, (2011), 30-44, p.32. 
61 Sally Dalton-Brown, ‘Ludic Nonchalance or Ludicrous Despair? Viktor Pelevin and Russian Postmodernist 
Prose’, Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 75, No. 2 (April 1997), 216-233, p.216. 
62 Ibid., p.227. 
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posthumanist, perspective on the world. This is how Ferrando summarises the posthumanist 
perspective:  
 
Posthumanism offers a revisitation of the being as transcendent immanence, disrupting one of the 
founding splits of Western thought, the one between transcendence and immanence, which 
symbolically relates to every other traditional dualism, such as: the mind/body, subject/object, 
self/other, male/female, human/animal-alien-robot. […] Posthumanism questions biocentrism and 
the concept of life itself, blurring the boundaries between the animate and the inanimate, in a 
quantum approach to the physics of existence.63  
Pelevin’s works appear to have a similar ring to them; like posthumanism, they 
‘question traditional humanist conceptions of man’ 64  by exposing the fallacy of human 
dogmas. This is achieved at various levels of the text by showing the subjectivity of human 
perceptions. One way is through the above principle of multiplicity – he creates multiple 
universes and interpretations of the same notions. He offers different perspectives, through 
expert commentaries, on the same events described in his novels, e.g. ‘Expert’s Commentary’ 
in Sviashchennaia kniga oborotnia or commentaries from a Sufi, a historian, a cultural expert, 
a lawyer, a drug expert after the story ‘Asasin’.65  
By consistently deconstructing anthropocentric assumptions he leaves the reader with 
the inevitable outcome: the need to redefine what it means to be human in today’s digital 
postmodernity. This strongly resonates with posthumanism that, in its anthropocentric 
nihilism, seeks to redefine the ontology of selfhood. In this regard, his transcendence of 
literary form works towards the bigger discourse of the definitive liberation of humankind 
that comes with the disembodied condition. This liberation requires a change in human 
perception of the self relative to the other and the world. The new vision – heterogeneous 
unity of all forms – can be developed through feeling an affinity between the self and the 
other. Pelevin’s stance hinges upon the realisation of the self as part of all matter: 
‘Избранные – это те, кто понимает, что любой червяк, бабочка или даже травинка на 
краю дороги – такие же точно избранные, просто временно об этом не знают’.66 It thus 
resonates with the posthumanist focus on acceptance of equality between human and 
 
63 Francesca Ferrando, ‘Towards A Posthumanist Methodology. A Statement’ (2012), 3-15 (p.11). 
64 Ranisch and Sorgner, p.23. 
65 Included in DPP (NN), 2003. 
66 Pelevin, Sviashchennaia kniga oborotnia, p.305. 
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transhuman beings.67 Pelevin’s posthumanism, therefore, is a philosophy of a disembodied 
condition leading to: ‘[…] new understandings of the self and others, essence, consciousness, 
intelligence, reason, agency, intimacy, life, embodiment, identity and the body’.68  
The following chapters address the above specific points of Pelevin’s non-
anthropocentric philosophy that expose the limited nature of the human and explore ways to 
transcend it. For that purpose, he scrutinises the relationship of the self to the outer world as 
perceived by the animal species, humans and non-sentient robotic beings. The research 
mainly focuses on his works from 1999, when Generation П was published, when the author 
becomes increasingly interested in emerging possibilities of transhumanism and its 
disembodied condition. The dissertation, however, also includes references to some of his 
earlier works that trace the roots of his posthumanist vision. A challenge of the research task 
in this respect concerned the versatility of philosophical and religious allusions and references 
that Pelevin makes to convey his message. In fact, he was criticised for conflating so many 
contrasting teachings and schools of thought and many dismissed his writing as superficial. 
For example, Basinskii described Chapaev i Pustota as ‘вещь, состоящая из дешевых 
каламбуров […], среднего языка и метафизического шкодничества’ 69 and complained 
that the author does not know the difference between mysticism and religion in the novel 
which are, in fact, poles apart. Similarly, Arkhangelskii commented on Pelevin’s superficial 
philosophy, his ‘игру в философичность’.70 However, I would argue that this philosophical 
pastiche, first, serves the same purpose of transcending conventions as manifestation of the 
liberated state; and second, is a way to illustrate the subjectivity of human perceptions arising 
from the human embodied condition - ‘мы наглухо заперты в теле’. 71  Thus Pelevin’s 
philosophical blends become a method contributing to the posthumanist message about the 
fallacy of human dogmas. The ‘philosophical games’ in Pelevin’s texts deconstruct the 
intellectual presumption of philosophy that claims to establish the truth by intellectual rigour 
and pure reason alone. Pelevin positions himself as a staunch critic of abstract philosophy that 
 
67 For example, Hughes’ essay ‘Democratic Transhumanism 2.0’ propagates ‘[s]upport rights for great apes, 
dolphins and whales:  Democratic transhumanists should join the campaigns to extend rights to great apes, 
dolphins and whales as a wedge to open rights to all intelligent persons, defeat human-racism, and build a 
cyborg citizenship.’ 
68 Shannon Bell in an interview to Adam Zaretsky, ‘Bioart in Question’ CIAC Electronic Magazine, 23 (2005), 
(p. 2) < https://itp.nyu.edu/classes/germline-spring2013/files/2013/01/Bioart_In_Question.pdf > [accessed 17 
August 2019] 
69 Pavel Basinskii, ‘Iz zhizni otechestennykh kaktusov’, Literaturnaia gazeta, 29 May 1996, p.6. 
70 Aleksandr Arkhangelskii, ‘Do shestnadtsati i starshe’, Izvestia, 24 March 1999, p.4.  
71 Pelevin, Ampir V, p.75. 
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is heavily relied on in order to understand the world. As he said in an interview to Rossiiskaia 
gazeta: 
 
Философский дискурс, в котором выдвигаются аргументы и контраргументы, кажется мне 
верхом нелепости […]. Мы существуем как бы ‘изнутри себя’, такова субъективная 
онтология нашего сознания. А философия претендует на то, что ответ на вопрос о природе и 
судьбе этого “взгляда изнутри” может быть дан “снаружи”, через манипуляцию 
абстрактными символами. (see note 44) 
 
This vision of philosophy as a system of abstract concepts trying to explain the essence of life 
brings to mind Bergson’s similar criticism. As Bergson pointed out in The Creative Evolution 
(1907), philosophies of radical finalism ‘extend too far the application of certain concepts that 
are natural to our intellect’ and as a result of this overreliance on abstraction, generated by the 
‘incorrigibly presumptuous’ subjectivity of our intellect, there is ‘the internal conflict of 
systems, the impossibility of satisfactorily getting the real into the ready-made garments of 
our ready-made concepts’.72 This similar position on abstract philosophical discourse is not 
the only parallel between Pelevin and Bergson that my analysis of Pelevin has revealed, even 
though Pelevin’s works do not make any explicit references to Bergson’s philosophy.  
Pelevin, however, has been analysed relative to a wide range of philosophical theories: 
Plato, Descartes, Kant, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, Foucault, Heidegger, Sartre, 
Baudrillard, Deleuze, Derrida, to name but a few. This becomes part of his method to develop 
his argument, through allusions to Western philosophies and Eastern religions. This 
dissertation, however, does not aim at an exhaustive analysis of philosophical references per 
se, but focuses only on the thinkers or beliefs relative to his posthumanist argument. What is 
of interest, and does not appear to have been addressed before, is a parallel between Pelevin 
and Bergson in terms of their method. Both tried to transcend the boundaries of conventional 
approach in their views and both received mixed reactions. Thus, Bergson is considered a 
‘poet-philosopher’,73 who tried to remove the distinction between science and metaphysical 
philosophy; in other words, he attempted to transcend the border of conventional thought. 
Perhaps Russell best expressed Bergson’s place in philosophy when he said that any attempt 
at classifying him would ‘fail as [his philosophy] […] cuts across all divisions, whether 
 
72 Henri Bergson, The Creative Evolution, transl. Arthur Mitchell (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1911), 
pp.47-48. 
73 Sholom J. Kahn, ‘Henri Bergson's Method’, The Antioch Review, vol.5, no.3 (1945), pp.440–451. 
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empiricist, realist, or idealist’.74 Pelevin was also described by Genis as ‘поэт, романтик, 
бытописатель пограничной зоны’ (see note 58), and the above paragraphs demonstrate that 
he too transcends the boundaries of any specific genre in literature. His works also blur the 
boundaries between intellectual and mass literature: ‘О виртуозной пелевинской игре 
высокими и низкими смыслами, сюжетами мировой философской мысли и клише 
обывательско-интеллигентского сознания, персонажами из анекдотов и архетипами 
мировой культуры, их взаимном перетекании, раздвоении и т.п. говорить не буду - те, 
кто читал, уже насладились этим, а нечитавшим передать невозможно’ (see note 3).   
This creative method escapes, or transcends, the boundaries of conventional 
metaphysics, literature, physics in an attempt to find, as Bergson puts it, ‘absolute 
knowledge’.75 As stated above, Pelevin creates multiple realities between which his characters 
drift in search of a way to escape the vicious circle of existence and grasp the ultimate 
meaning of life. Pelevin’s recurring theme of escape becomes a defining goal for his 
protagonists, whether achieved or not. It has been addressed by many literary critics. Vaingurt 
defines it as ‘достижени[е] подлинного бытия и просветления’; 76  Bykov – ‘поиск 
подлинности’, ‘oсвобождение’ (see note 57); Kamenetskii – ‘постичь основной принцип 
жизни, ее суть, Истину’;77 Karaev, like Kornev, links it with Buddhism and talks about 
‘приближении к ней [реальности]’.78  
The imagery that Bergson and Pelevin employ to describe the elusive concept of 
absolute knowledge about life (in their respective philosophies) creates a picture of 
‘heterogeneous multiplicity’ in ‘duration’ and ‘unity’ – critical notions in Bergson’s seminal 
work, The Creative Evolution. Both associate it with a river, a flow, a stream consisting of 
infinite individual particles. Bergson’s ‘élan vital’ (the force of life) is compared in his poetic 
text with a wave that progresses to a river:  
 
Life as a whole, from the initial impulsion that thrust it into the world, will appear as a wave which 
rises, and which is opposed by the descending movement of matter. […] The matter that it bears 
 
74 Philippe Soulez and Frederic Worms, F., Bergson (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2002), p.124. 
75 Bergson, Creative Evolution, p.52. 
76 Julia Vaingurt, ‘Svoi sredi drugikh: kontseptsya u chitatela’, transl. A.Moroz, ed. K.Korchagin, NLO, 1 (149) 
(2018), 509-24 (p.515).  
77 Aleksandr Kamenetskii, ‘Pozdnie chelovekolubtsy’, <http://pelevin.nov.ru/stati/o-lim/1.html> 
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along with it […] alone can divide it into distinct individualities. […] Consciousness is distinct 
from the organism it animates, although it must undergo its vicissitudes.79   
 
Pelevin’s works have very similar poetics: ‘капл[я] в бесконечной реке, которая текла из 
одной необъятности в другую. Каждая капля этой реки была равна всей реке целиком 
[…] в нем просто отражалась бесконечность, как весь мир отражается в капле воды’.80 
This heterogeneous multiplicity corresponds with the disembodied condition of 
transhumanism and also with the posthumanist all-inclusive equality of all forms.  
In developing a structure for my dissertation I was guided by three common aspects in 
Bergson’s and Pelevin’s approach to experience of life: their poetics in describing the cycle of 
life; the transcendence of time and space conventions; and their criticism of intellectual 
analysis in understanding life. I took account of these factors to classify the transhumanist 
experiences of Pelevin’s characters. The dissertation thus focuses on the role of instinct and 
intellect in human life and identifies the need for an intuitive path to true understanding of life 
and thus to liberation. Is it based on Bergson’s three channels of attaining absolute knowledge 
– through instinct, intellect and intuition. In Creative Evolution he maintained that ‘instinct 
[…] is molded on the very form of life’, while ‘intellect is the faculty of constructing 
unorganised […] artificial […] instruments’. As a result: ‘There are things that intelligence is 
able to seek, but which, by itself, it will never find. These things instinct alone could fine; but 
it will never seek them’. It follows that these two tools can be used as a way to obtain 
‘relative knowledge’ (which is incomplete), but in order to grasp ‘absolute knowledge’ one 
needs to rely on intuition that enables one to place oneself in the above ‘duration’ and 
heterogeneous multiple unity. Bergson maintains that true understanding of reality can be best 
achieved through intuition, or ‘true empiricism’, because it is a kind of experience, but deeper 
and more meaningful.81 
The relevant references to his theories will be made in respective chapters of the 
dissertation, as required, relative to Pelevin’s imagery and views on transhumanism. The 
dissertation, therefore, is structured according to the instinctive-intellectual-intuitive 
experiences of the transhuman characters. Chapter 1 explores the man vs animal opposition, 
focusing on the instinct-driven perception of the world free from unnatural constructs of the 
modern human civilization. It looks at the works in which the transhumanist stylistics is 
 
79 Bergson, Creative Evolution, Chapter III, pp.293-4. 
80 Pelevin, Chapaev, p.238. 
81 Bergson, Creative Evolution, pp.150-175. 
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represented by transmutation into wolves, foxes, or vampires and the revelatory effects that 
such transformations have on the protagonists. These works include ‘Problema vervolka v 
srednei polose’ (Sinii fonar, 1991), Sviashchennaia kniga oborotnia (2004), and Ampir 
V/Batman Apollo duology (2006/2013). Chapter 2 deals with the perception of the world 
through intellect, which, in Pelevin’s reading of the philosophy of ‘pure reason’, is free from 
artificially imposed human constructs. The main works selected for this chapter revolve 
around media and artificial intelligence and include Generation П (1999), Ananasnaia voda 
dla prekrasnoi damy (2010), S.N.U.F.F. (2011), and iPhuck10 (2017). Tracking the 
possibilities and social changes brought about by latest scientific advances, the writer 
compares the irrational human mind prone to manipulation with the rational non-human 
algorithm.  
Finally, Chapter 3 explores the concept of intuition in Pelevin’s posthumanist argument 
and analyses Pelevin’s vision of the ‘intuitive path’ towards a redefined posthuman future. 
For this purpose, the chapter looks into the philosophical notions of time, life, matter, and 
absolute in Pelevin’s works as integral elements of his philosophy. The works in focus here 
include t (2009) and Tainye vidy na goru Fudzi (2018), with references to the earlier Chapaev 
i Pustota and Sviashchennaia kniga oborotnia. 
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Chapter 1 
Relating to the World through Instinct 
Pelevin's works with superhuman half-animal creatures as protagonists treat the transhumanist 
theme of disembodiment as an ability to overcome cognitive, spatial, and temporal 
limitations. I will focus only on works in which human characters undergo a transformation 
into vampires and werewolves, because the revelatory effects of their transhuman experiences 
emphasise the difference between humans and animals in their perception of the world. The 
vampire/monster theme is not new in literature. The Gothic tradition viewed these creatures in 
various contexts, like social alienation, yearning for acceptance, forbidden emotion and 
feeling of guilt, as in Bram Stoker’s Dracula (1897) or Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein (1818). 
What the Gothic subgenres have in common, according to Botting, is the element of 
‘otherness and monstrosity’. 82  Such an approach to the theme emphasises human 
anthropocentrism in relating itself to the animal species and treating it as ‘the other’. In fact, 
this neglect of the animal experience seems to be a common shortcoming in the human-
centred Western philosophical discourse, as pointed out by Derrida: 
The experience of the seeing animal, of the animal that looks at them, has not been taken into 
account in the philosophical or theoretical architecture of their discourse [Descartes, Kant, 
Heidegger, Lacan, and Levinas]. In sum they have denied it as much as misunderstood it. From 
here on we shall circle round and round this immense disavowal, whose logic traverses the whole 
history of humanity, and not only that of the quasi-epochal configuration I just mentioned.83 
This feature of Pelevin’s works, zoomorphism, has predominantly been analysed in the 
traditional terms of literary text analysis, such as genre conventions and allegorical and 
carnivalesque postmodernist canon (see Introduction). Khagi, however, adds a new 
perspective to zoomorphic analysis in her article ‘The Monstrous Aggregate of the Soul: 
Towards Biopolitics in Viktor Pelevin’s Work’ (2011) which resonates with the 
transcendence narrative of transhumanism, albeit in the grim light of pernicious biopolitics. 
Drawing on Foucault’s social theory and biopolitical essays, Khagi interprets animal imagery 
in Pelevin’s works as representations of the human social collective. She identifies, through 
 
82 Fred Botting, Gothic, the New Critical Idiom (London: Routledge, 1996), p.14. 
83 Jaques Derrida, ‘The Animal Therefore I Am (More to Follow)’, trans. by David Wills, ed. by Marie-Lousie 
Mallet (New York: Fordham, 2008), p.14. 
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these bio representations, an associative chain - humans-animals-biomass-source of energy 
(blood or oil)-money – through which biopolitics expresses itself in conditions of 
‘hypercommodification of life resulting in dehumanization and social reduction…’.84 This 
interpretation resonates with Foucault’s vision of biopolitics which ‘aims at a multiplicity of 
humans, not to the extent that they are mere individual bodies, but to the extent that they form 
a global mass that is affected by processes of birth, illness, reproduction, death, etc.’85 Khagi 
thus suggests that Pelevin’s zoomorphic imagery highlights the ‘deindividualized status of the 
individual in modem society and buttress[es] the author's diagnosis of the collapse of 
spirituality, rampant consumerism, and covert but nonetheless efficient modes of social 
control in modern life’.86 While some of Pelevin’s early works allow for such a reading of 
artistic biomorphism, e.g. Zhizn’ nasekomykh where society is presented as a biomorphic 
monstrosity, other animal representations appear to serve a different purpose, juxtaposing the 
animal to the human but to the advantage of the animal. Thus, Livers interprets Pelevin’s 
trope of lycanthropy in Sviashchennaia kniga oborotnia from the transhumanist perspective 
of transcendence: ‘Pelevin uses the figure of a shape-shifting “were-fox” to unsettle the 
animal/human distinction’.87 Genis’s commentary in his article ‘Granitsy i metamorfozy’ fits 
into the same transhumanist context of intermediality and transcendence: ‘Pelevin frequently 
turns to animals, which enables him to populate yet another limit, namely that of the border 
between species’.88  
It follows from this interpretation, therefore, that Pelevin addresses the issue of the-self-
vs-the-other in this animalistic context in order to dismantle the human superiority myth and 
build a case for his broader posthumanist message, which is that all living beings are equal 
because they are part of the same matter. He approaches this task from the ontological 
perspective, exploring the difference in experiencing life in an ordinary human state as 
opposed to a supercreature state. The concept that comes to the fore in this context is instinct. 
It has to be noted that the term ‘instinct’ has a wide number of interpretations depending on 
the academic field, the most varied range being in psychology which distinguishes between 
 
84 Sofya Khagi, ‘The Monstrous Aggregate of the Soul: Towards Biopolitics in Victor Pelevin’s Work’, Slavic 
and East European Journal Vol. 55, No. 3 (Fall 2011), 439-459, (p.455) 
85 Michel Foucault, ‘Society must be defended’, Lectures at the College de France, 1975-76, (New York: 
Picador, 2003), p.143. 
86 Khagi, Ibid., p.455. 
87 Livers, ‘Is There Humanity in Posthumanity?’, p.504. 
88 Ibid., p.301. 
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inherited and learned behaviours. 89 However, the ‘nature-nurture’ aspect is not relevant here 
since this analysis is preoccupied with the philosophical interpretation of the notion in literary 
material. As outlined in the Introduction, the dissertation is based on Bergson’s model of 
perception that juxtaposes instinct and intelligence. Bergson understands instinct as being ‘not 
within the domain of intelligence’. And even though he admits that instinct ‘is not situated 
beyond the limits of mind’, he places sensory perception above mind processing in his 
definition of instinct; as he puts it, an instinctive understanding of life must be ‘originally felt, 
rather than thought’.90  
This interpretation resonates with the distinction that Pelevin draws between instinct 
and intellect: in his narrative the former can be understood as experience of life through 
sensory perception without the self-inflicted limits of the clouded human mind. The main 
source of human inhibitions and illusions is the language through which human beings 
experience life. By showing a richer experience of existence through instinct peculiar to the 
animal species the author decenters the traditional human superiority. Transhumanism in this 
context serves as an artistic device to introduce human protagonists to the uninhibited, acute 
sensory perceptions of their transgressed physicality. Through the contrast with their former 
bleak human experiences, this leads to liberating revelations about the world. Transcending 
the bodily constraints helps the protagonists ‘постичь Истину’, as werefox A-Huli says in 
Sviashchennaia kniga oborotnia.91 The changed perspective - man is part of the same matter 
as all other living forms – removes the barrier between the self and the other and, therefore, 
resonates with the posthumanist equality of all, sentient and non-sentient, forms. 
Pelevin’s interest in the literary potential of transhumanism can be traced back to his 
very first published work, short story ‘Koldun Ignat i ludi’ (1989),92 where he introduces the 
other-vs-humans interpretation of the theme. The other is a sorcerer with superpowers, 
‘колдун Игнат’, who is the target of a malicious priest Arsenikum setting people against him 
because ‘koldun’ is different: ‘Всем миром решили. Мир завсегда колдунов убивает’.93 
These lines reveal the gullible nature of humans who decide to follow convention and kill the 
other. Man’s distorted perception of the world based on abstract ideas about it becomes a 
recurring theme in Pelevin’s works.  
 
89 Mark S. Bloomberg, ‘Development evolving: The origins and meanings of instinct’, WIREs Cogn Sci, 8 
(2017), doi: 10.1002/wcs.1371 <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5182125/> 
90 Bergson, Creative Evolution, pp.172, 175. 
91 Pelevin, Sviashchennaia kniga oborotnia, p.290. 
92 First published in Nauka i religia, 12 (1989), p.4. 
93 Ibid., p.6. Ebook. 
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As the story unfolds, the human being's inferior position is further revealed through the 
immortality of the sorcerer Ignat, who vanishes in the air to escape the human crowd. Such an 
ending correlates with the idea of disembodiment, or transcendence of physical boundaries 
and therefore introduces a posthumanist ring to the story. The other, koldun Ignat, continues 
to exist in a disembodied condition as the words ‘растворяясь в воздухе’ (see note 93) do 
not imply a dying body. In its purely biological interpretation death implies finality of 
existence, whereas the ending in the story adds a metaphysical element to Pelevin’s 
interpretation of death versus immortality. Being part of greater matter, Ignat does not ‘cease 
to be’, he merely transgresses the physical constraints of the human body, continuing to exist 
in some other form. After the metaphysical transformation of the main character, the 
semantics of death changes in the story; the word acquires a metaphorical meaning of ‘death 
of the mind and spirit’ (which becomes a recurring theme in his works). As Ignat observes 
during his flight,  ‘[…] мир сам давно убит своими собственными колдунами’ (see note 
93). So from the very first story, Pelevin introduces the problem of the human existential trap 
resulting from self-deception.  
The next step in Pelevin’s posthumanist argument is to analyse the nature and roots of 
self-deception, which clouds the human mind and makes him unable to relate to the other as 
he is unable to see his true self. Thus, in the story ‘Problema vervolka v srednei polose’ the 
author explores the topic of perception of the world through instinct. He tries to identify how 
instinct, or sensory-driven perception, can liberate man's confused and disoriented mind from 
cultural imperatives imposed by society. Instinct in his works, as will be shown in this 
chapter, enables a living creature to see and feel the world in its ‘pure’ form. The story 
focuses on natural animal freedom and power of instinct, fullness of life compared to the 
weak and subjective human nature. In this first artistic experiment with animal-based 
transhumanism, he explores the distinction between humans and animals: ‘Люди, отметил 
Саша, способны только говорить, а вот ощутить смысл жизни так же, как ветер или 
холод, они не могут’. 94  Started in ‘Koldun Ignat’, the theme of human muddled 
consciousness is brought up again:  
 
[...] главная метаморфоза, которую отметил Саша, касалась самоосознания. На человеческом 
языке это было очень трудно выразить, и Саша стал лаять, визжать и скулить про себя — так 
же, как раньше думал словами…95  
 
94 Pelevin, ‘Problema vervolka’, p.59. 
95 Ibid., p.57. 
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Perception of life without distortion, through instinct, appears to be the desired liberation, 
which leads to a feeling of blissfulness and clarity of thought and vision:  
 
Изменение в самоосознании касалось смысла жизни […] и смысл жизни чувствовался 
непрерывно и отчетливо, как некоторое вечное свойство мира, наглухо скрытое от человека, 
— и в этом было главное очарование нынешнего состояния Саши, […] жизнь без этого 
чувства казалась длинным болезненным сном, неинтересным и мутным, какие снятся при 
гриппе.96  
 
The reference to life as a dream brings to mind Plato’s cave allegory, often alluded to in 
Pelevin’s works (e.g. ‘Sozertsatel teni’, iPhuck10, Tainye vidy na goru Fudzi). In The 
Republic Plato talks of prisoners who live in a cave and see only shadows of objects that pass 
in the light behind them; thus they live in a superficial reality of shadows, giving names not to 
actual objects but their shadow representations: ‘To them, I said, the truth would be literally 
nothing but the shadows of the images’.97 Although Plato’s allegory is used in the more 
specific context of learning, illusory knowledge as against true knowledge, the idea that 
comes to the fore in Pelvin's story concerns the bleakness of representations compared to the 
richer original experience. The point that Pelevin makes is that animals are able to perceive 
life without the distortions of the human constructs.  
Such a vision resonates with the Rousseauist idea of innate instincts outlined in his 
work Upon The Inequality Among Mankind, 1754.98 In it he contends that humans, an animal 
species by origin, used to share innate instincts with animals in a ‘state of nature’, but forgot 
them and lost clarity of vision as a result of applying reason and forming a civilised society: 
 
I have endeavoured to exhibit the origin and progress of inequality, the institution and abuse of 
political societies […]. It follows from this picture, that as there is scarce any inequality among 
men in a state of nature, all that which we now behold owes its force and its growth to the 
 
96 Ibid., p.58. 
97 Plato, VII ‘On Shadows and Realities in Education’, The Republic, transl. by Benjamin Jowett (New York: 
The Modern Library, 1941), Project Gutenberg <https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/1497> [accessed 8 
September 2019] 
98  Jean Jaques Rousseau ‘A Discourse Upon The Origin And The Foundation Of The Inequality Among 
Mankind’, Parts 1 and 2, 1754, transl. for an anthology of Harvard Classics, Volume 34, 1910, Project 
Gutenberg <https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/11136> [accessed 8 September 2019] 
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development of our faculties and the improvement of our understanding, and at last becomes 
permanent and lawful by the establishment of property and of laws.99  
 
In order to bring out this stark difference in the uninhibited ability to experience life to the full 
and to be free through instinct Pelevin focuses on the vibrancy of transhuman experiences of 
the protagonist. The imagery that the author employs to convey the difference between the 
animal and the human sentient experiences covers the whole polyphony of sensory 
perceptions:  
 
Во-первых, он различал множество пронизывающих воздух запахов. Это было похоже на 
второе зрение. […] Такая же перемена произошла со звуками: они стали гораздо 
осмысленней.100 
 
The constraints of the human body are overcome and he enjoys the liberation of the 
disembodied condition:  
[…] вдруг он порвал тонкую нить, связывавшую его с землей, и понесся вверх. […] Он стал 
глядеть вверх и увидел, что приближается к небу.101  
In order to emphasise the liberating experience of transformation into a werewolf the author 
contrasts Sasha's perception of the same familiar surroundings in his human and animal body. 
At first, before his transhuman experience, when Sasha is lost in the forest he longs for the 
pseudo-comfort of the civilised world: ‘Гудение проводов напоминало, что где-то на свете 
живут нормальные люди, вырабатывают днем электричество, а вечером смотрят с его 
помощью телевизор’.102 The TV set in this story represents modern ‘civilised’ conditions in 
opposition to the wildness of nature, i.e. animal existence, and reveals human limited 
experience of life. Like the prisoner from Plato’s cave, Sasha is conditioned to feel ‘normal’, 
and therefore, comfortable in self-inflicted constraints of human ‘progress’ – electricity and 
television: ‘Саша подумал, что наконец его подбросят куда-нибудь, где над головой 
будет электрическая лампа, по бокам — стены, и можно будет спокойно заснуть’ (see 
note 102). 
 
99 Ibid., Part I. 
100 Pelevin, ‘Problema vervolka’, p.55. 
101 Ibid., p.56. 
102 Ibid., p.66. 
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After the transformation into a werewolf, however, Sasha’s clearer perception shifts his 
perspective and the same environment seems a pale shadow of the original:  
Саша нашел картину зловещей и прекрасной: стального цвета тела неподвижно сидели 
вокруг пустого, похожего на арену, пространства; […] крашеные домики людей, 
облепленные телеантеннами и курятниками, гаражи из ворованной жести и косой Парфенон 
клуба […] — все это казалось даже не декорацией к реальности, сосредоточенной на сорока 
круглых метрах в середине площади, а пародией на декорацию.103  
Human existence now appears to him inferior to that of animals: ‘он понял и то, что вряд ли 
по своей воле вернется в свое прошлое естество’ (see note 103).  
The newly perceived vibrancy of life, the immanence of being, is felt to be a result of 
instinct as the guiding principle, not reason. The workings of the werewolf’s mind prompt the 
right instinctive action, without the human constraints that evoke doubt and hesitation: 
‘Волчья часть его существа приняла на себя управление его действиями, он больше ни 
в чем не сомневался’.104 In fact, this shedding of doubt becomes the turning point of Sasha’s 
transhuman revelation. He becomes a werewolf after, counter-intuitively for any reasonable 
man, he agrees to a ritual of initiation that involves a fight with a much stronger werewolf: 
Услышать зов — это не главное. Это не сделает тебя оборотнем. Знаешь, когда ты стал им 
по-настоящему? — Когда ты согласился драться с Николаем, считая, что не имеешь 
надежды на победу. Тогда и изменилась твоя тень.105  
Similarly, in Ampir V, a vampire body allows the protagonist Rama to transcend human 
limitations of doubt and hesitation and be freely guided by instinct: ‘Надо довериться 
инстинкту’.106  
These revelations of the physically transformed protagonists indicate that doubt and 
fear, inhibiting action, arise from applying reason, i.e. from thinking. Without it the mutated 
protagonists’ cognitive abilities become much better: 
Я заметил, что перестал думать. Мой ум больше не генерировал бессвязных мыслей - 
внутреннее пространство, где они раньше клубились, теперь словно пропылесосили - в нем 
осталось только острое и точное осознание того, что происходит вокруг.107  
 
103 Ibid., p.82. 
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In his deconstruction of the grand narrative of the superiority of Homo Sapiens, Pelevin 
targets the human language as the main construct, limiting human experience. This becomes a 
recurring theme in his works. It is general knowledge in the anthropocentric evolutionary 
discourse that human language is a factor distinguishing humans from animals. Pelevin, 
however, reverts the hierarchy: instead of enriching human life, it has become a detriment 
obstructing the fullness of human existence. This idea is explicitly voiced in the novel and 
generally in Pelevin’s narrative:  
 
— Ты действительно думаешь, что человек поднялся в результате эволюции выше 
животных? 
— Конечно, - ответил я. - А разве нет? 
— Нет, - сказал он. - Он опустился гораздо ниже.108 
 
Ampir V analyses the impact of language on human perception and introduces the term ‘ум А’ 
to refer to instinctive/sensory perception of the world: ‘Всеми действиями управляют 
рефлексы и инстинкты. […] Он имеет дело только с отражением мира’.109 This kind of 
perception is common to all animal species, including humans: ‘Ум "А" есть и у обезьяны, и 
у человека’.110 He underlines the representational nature of sensory perception as the first 
point of contact between the subject and reality: ‘[…] мы живем не среди предметов, а 
среди ощущений, поставляемых нашими органами чувств’.111  
The next stage is cognition that involves processing of the received sensory stimuli, 
which is the domain of ‘ум Б’ and is peculiar only to humans: ‘люди отличаются от 
животных. […] ум "Б" есть только у человека’ (see note 110). And it is this processing 
stage that leads to distortion of reality because it involves interpretation of the received 
sensory perceptions: ‘Мы наглухо заперты в теле, а то, что кажется нам реальностью - 
просто интерпретация электрических сигналов, приходящих в мозг. Мы получаем 
фотографии внешнего мира от органов чувств’. 112  The key point here is the false 
representation of reality and the limitations of the human mind in our embodied condition: ‘А 
[мы] сами сидим внутри полого шара, стены которого оклеены этими фотографиями. 
 
107 Ibid., p.24. 
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 35 
Этот полый шар и есть наш мир, из которого мы никуда не можем выйти при всем 
желании’.113 
This approach to human perception reveals Pelevin's awareness of semiotic theories. 
The picture metaphor, in particular, brings to mind two references in line with the author's 
views on the language. The first is early Wittgenstein's ‘picture theory’.114 Pelevin explicitly 
mentions the German philosopher in the preface to his earlier story ‘Devatyi son Very 
Pavlovny’, which reveals his engagement with the topic even before Ampir V: ‘Здесь мы 
можем видеть, что солипсизм совпадает с чистым реализмом, если он строго продуман. 
Людвиг Витгенштейн’. 115 It has to be said that Wittgenstein's ‘picture theory’ of meaning is 
controversial and subject to so many interpretations that it could be a topic of a separate 
analysis. Pelevin engages with it only within the scope of his literary goal – his imaginative 
interpretation of it illustrates his message. I will therefore look at those aspects of the theory 
that are reflected in Pelevin’s texts. In Wittgenstein’s ‘picture theory’ the capacity of language 
and thought represents reality. Wittgenstein maintains that the whole of reality consists of 
facts (‘states of affairs’ in Tractatus) that are represented by our thoughts as ‘pictures’ of this 
reality: ‘the picture is a model of reality’; ‘the logical picture of the facts is the thought’. 
Propositions can ‘picture’ the world to the limit of logic: ‘The limits of my language mean the 
limits of my world’. 116 They also can act as true or false representations of the facts.  
As we see from quotations above, Pelevin borrows the concepts of falsehood and 
limitation as well as the imagery from Wittgenstein's theory and plays with them to convey 
his idea about the false nature of human perception of reality. In Pelevin's view, the human 
mind (‘ум Б’) distorts the facts: ‘[…] ум "Б" […] никак не связан с фотографиями на 
стенах шара и производит фантазмы из себя самого. В его глубинах возникает такое… 
полярное сияние из абстрактных понятий’ (see note 109). And the reason for this 
distortion is the tendency of the mind to apply arbitrary abstract concepts of the human 
language: ‘Слова подобны якорям – кажется, что они позволяют надежно укрепиться в 
истине, но на деле они лишь держат ум в плену’.117 In the context of the innate animal 
instincts vs civilised human world, one cannot but recall Rousseau's remark on abstract 
 
113 Ibid., p.150. 
114 L.Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), trans. by C. K. Ogden (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul), 1922, Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der 
Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. 
115 Pelevin, ‘Devatyi son Very Pavlovny’, p.196. 
116 Wittgenstein, Tractatus, Sections 2.12, 3, 5.6. 
117 Pelevin, Sviashchennaia kniga oborotnia, p.299. 
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thought: ‘abstraction is an unnatural and very painful operation’.118 As seen in his works and 
also mentioned in the Introduction, Pelevin too is a staunch critic of generalisations and 
abstract speculations.  
This criticism of abstraction again resonates with Wittgenstein’s views, in this case with 
his ‘language game theory’ outlined in Philosophical Investigations, 1953.119 Its key point is 
the infinite multiplicity of contextual and unfixed uses of language, which leads to 
‘misunderstandings concerning the use of words’. 120  In Sviashchennaia kniga oborotnia 
Pelevin echoes a similar view: ‘любые описания только помешают, создав […] ложное 
представление’. 121  It transpires from this reasoning that a word contributes to human 
entrapment, which correlates with the idea of confinement in the context of embodied 
condition; and the word itself represents an artificial embodied condition of otherwise infinite 
reality.  
Pelevin uses the multiplicity of representation and perception of the language to develop 
his argument and expose the use of the language as a powerful weapon of manipulation of the 
human mind. In this context he introduces the terms ‘дискурс’ and ‘гламур’: ‘Их 
сущностью является маскировка и контроль - и, как следствие, власть’.122 ‘Discourse’ 
stands for the verbal side of the language, i.e. representations of objects through signifiers: 
‘Все, что человек говорит - это дискурс...’123 ‘Glamour’ implies arbitrary value judgments 
that the human mind is conditioned to ascribe to these signifiers: ‘А гламур […] это 
переливающаяся игра беспредметных образов, […] [которая] обещает чудо’. 124 
According to the explanation in the story, these judgments are formed in ‘ум Б’ that is limited 
and prone to influence:  
 
ум "Б" у этих людей настроен на одну и ту же волну. Он заставляет их видеть одинаковую 
галлюцинацию. 
— А кто создает эту галлюцинацию? - спросил я. 
Ум "Б" и создает. Точнее, множество таких умов, поддерживающих друг друга. […] у вас в 
голове пять тысяч маркетологов срали десять лет. (See note 110) 
 
118 Rousseau, Upon Inequality, Part 2. 
119  Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical investigations, trans. by G.E.M.Anscombe (New York: Macmillan, 
1953). 
120 Ibid., Section 90, p.43. 
121 Pelevin, Sviashchennaia kniga oborotnia, p.247. 
122 Pelevin, Ampir V, p.47. 
123 Ibid., p.48. 
124 Ibid., p.32. 
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As a result of linguo-cultural programming human life revolves around the spell of words that 
cloud his mind and become a constraint depraving a human being. As a vampire in the novel 
observes, the life of contemporary humans is so limited that: 
 
[…] только ушедший от дел миллионер может позволить себе образ жизни животного: жить 
на природе в самых подходящих для организма климатических условиях, много двигаться, 
есть экологически чистую пищу, и при этом вообще никогда ни о чем не волноваться.125  
 
What is more, mankind falls prey to this manipulation of ‘discourse and glamour’ of its own 
volition. According to the theory offered in the novel, a person seeks relief in disguising the 
disturbing reality by an illusory verbal reality. Just like words acquire meaning within a 
contextual system of language, signs acquire values in a hierarchy of prestige and status. This 
yearning for masquerade is termed in the novel ‘тяга к переодеванию’ and is represented by 
conspicuous consumption. 126  This is how Pelevin describes the pervasive trend: 
‘Переодевание включает переезд с Каширки на Рублевку и с Рублевки в Лондон, 
пересадку кожи с ягодиц на лицо, перемену пола и все такое прочее. Весь современный 
дискурс тоже сводится к переодеванию - или новой упаковке’.127 The message of this 
eager self-deception is that reality is more readily accepted if it creates an attractive, lulling 
illusion even if it is phrased in hyper-real terms. There is a clear parallel between this 
explanation and Baudrillard’s theory of simulacra whereby the imaginary appeal perceived by 
the human mind is more valued than the actual reality.128 As a result, humankind is dominated 
by signs, which limits the scope of human existence:  
 
Дело в том, что между умственным процессом вампира и человека есть важное отличие. 
Думая, вампир использует те же ментальные конструкции, что и человек. Но его мысль 
движется между ними по другому маршруту, который так же отличается от предсказуемого 
человеческого мышления, как благородная траектория несущейся сквозь сумрак летучей 
мыши отличается от кругов городского голубя над зимней помойкой.129 
 
125 Ibid., p.148. 
126 The term is associated with T.Veblen’s theory outlined in his Theory of the Leisure Class, 1899, and means 
public display of social status and prestige through commodities. 
127 Pelevin, Ampir V, p.57. 
128 Lipovetskii addressed the influence of Baudrillard on Pelevin in his article ‘Goluboe salo pokoleniia, ili Dva 
mifa ob odnom krizise’ in Znama (11), 1999. See note 6 
129 Pelevin, Ampir V, p.75. 
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The above observations reiterate the self-inflicted nature of human limitations. In the 
traditional anthropocentric discourse man appears to be superior to animals in his free will:   
 
I perceive the very same things in the human machine, with this difference, that nature alone 
operates in all the operations of the beast, whereas man, as a free agent, has a share in his. One 
chooses by instinct; the other by an act of liberty; for which reason the beast cannot deviate from 
the rules that have been prescribed to it, even in cases where such deviation might be useful, and 
man often deviates from the rules laid down for him to his prejudice.130  
  
But in fact, man's misuse of free will limits his existence: this is Pelevin’s message in this 
context. When choosing to buy status symbols he and his actions are dominated by the 
arbitrary value judgments of prestige and power. This exposes the gullible programmed 
human mind - referred to as ‘податлив[ый] шипуч[ий] студ[ень]’.131  
These observations create a case for decentering the human as the measure of all being. 
It is the central message explicitly voiced at the start of Ampir V, in a dialogue between the 
newly converted vampire Rama and his mature vampire-teacher Enlil Maratovich: 
Люди по непонятной причине считают себя носителями добра и света, - продолжал он. – 
[…] Попробуй назвать мне хоть одну причину, по которой люди лучше мышей-вампиров. —
 […] Больше мне ничего не пришло в голову.132 
Ampir V deconstructs the anthropocentric myth and even goes further by reversing the man-
above-animals hierarchy. This is how Rousseau describes the traditional pattern: ‘He […] in 
time became the master of those [animals] that could be of any service to him, and a sore 
enemy to those that could do him any mischief. 'Tis thus, that the first look he gave into 
himself produced the first emotion of pride in him; […] by attributing to his species the first 
rank among animals in general’.133 By contrast, in Ampir V it is the manipulated humankind 
that is subordinated and exploited – by vampires: ‘Они [vampires] решили создать себе 
дойное животное. В результате появился человек. […] — Правильнее говорить не 
 
130 Rousseau, Upon Inequality, Part I, para. 14. 
131 Pelevin, Sviashchennaia kniga oborotnia, p.286. 
132 Pelevin, Ampir V, p.39. 
133 Rousseau, Upon Inequality, Part II, para. 6. 
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“создали” а “вывели”. Примерно так же, как собака или овца были выведены 
человеком’.134  
To further dismantle the anthropocentric myth of humanism the author goes on to show 
that mankind does not adhere to the humanist set of values it once developed. In a curious 
way these transhumanist narratives guide the reader towards the realization that the ‘non-
human’ nature of werewolves or vampires is the essence of true humanism (this term is used 
here in the meaning of a system of traditional values of compassion, understanding, empathy, 
etc, and not in the meaning of man's superiority). For example, in ‘Problema vervolka’ a 
mature werewolf concludes that ‘только оборотни – реальные люди’, 135  which is why 
werewolves cast human shadows in the story whereas humans cast those of other swine, goats 
and insects. The choice of these animals ‘свинья’, ‘коза’, ‘насекомое’ is not random – this is 
an implicit reference to the derogatory meanings that these words can have in Russian; and in 
Pelevin’s transhumanist narrative this imagery becomes the opposite of humanism that is 
associated with mankind. In Ampir V, the author sustains the metaphor whereby humans are 
associated with crawling insects, while super-creatures are free with their ability to fly (flight 
is a metaphor for freedom in many of his works, e.g. ‘Zatvornik i Shestipalyi’, ‘Omon Ra’): 
Мне представилось, что где-то в Москве такое же жуткое перепончатокрылое существо 
простирает крыла над миром, а люди ничего не замечают и муравьями ползут по своим 
делам.136 
In Pelevin’s transhumanist narrative it is non-human creatures, like werewolves, that are 
capable of feelings that are traditionally considered prime values of humanity, which are  
compassion and empathy: ‘Саше […] стало немного жаль старого волка, которого он 
загрыз в люди, и, вспоминая перебранку, а особенно перемену, которая произошла с 
Николаем за минуту до драки, он испытывал к нему почти симпатию’.137 The same idea 
is reiterated in Ampir V: although humans are portrayed as a lower caste created to provide 
food for higher-evolutionary creatures, the vampires teach their ‘young’ to love and pity 
people: ‘[…] презирать человека […] ни в коем случае нельзя, - сказал он. - Запомни как 
следует, для вампира это […] постыдно […]. Мы вывели людей, Рама. Поэтому мы 
 
134 Ampir V, p.142. 
135 Pelevin, ‘Problema vervolka’, p.97. 
136 Pelevin, Ampir V, p.10. 
137 Pelevin, ‘Problema vervolka’, p.95. 
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должны любить и жалеть их. Такими, какие они есть. Кроме нас, их не пожалеет 
никто’.138  
The fact that vampires, who are portrayed as exploiters of mankind, are capable of 
compassion and empathy completely undermines the human dominance myth. In addition, the 
words trans- and post-human suggest an idea of a limit to humanity. It appears that the main 
human constraints are mind subjectivity that distorts reality and human weaknesses urging 
him to run to excesses in exercising free will. This chapter has analysed the inability of 
humankind to follow instinct as a result of applying reason, i.e. intellect, and thus having a 
distorted perception of reality through arbitrary language representations. The next chapter, 
therefore, focuses on artificial intelligence that Pelevin explores in his later works for its 
potential to eliminate the subjectivity of human perception. 
 
 
138 Pelevin, Ampir V, p.63. 
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Chapter 2 
Artificial Intelligence, or Pelevin’s Critique of Human ‘Pure Reason’ 
Throughout his fiction, Pelevin explores the possibilities that arise from relentless 
technological and scientific progress. He places his posthumanist narrative in the modern 
context of artificial intelligence. The author compares humans and robots to explore the extent 
of their differences, with the key area of comparison being mind and sentience. He also 
explores the potential for ‘pure reason’139 of artificial intellect to liberate the human from self-
inflicted constructs.  
Pelevin begins his comparative analysis of humans and robots with the theme of 
manipulation and programming. Human self-deception, discussed in Chapter 1, is placed here 
in the context of media and computer technologies. Pelevin’s early story ‘Prints Gosplana’ is 
an allegory of modern human life that is portrayed as a computer game. Transhumanism is 
used as an artistic device and is represented in blurring the boundaries between the human 
protagonist’s life and virtual reality. At first Sasha appears as a young ordinary man whose 
monotonous bleak life is confined to his time at work and moments spent by playing a 
computer game. But as the story unfolds, his life gets mixed with the moves in the computer 
game. The reader begins to question the objectivity of his impressions and his free will.  
The theme of manipulated human mind is further developed in Generation П, a critical 
view of artificial, consumerist values shaped by the media through a pseudo-reality beamed 
through a TV screen. The transhumanist reading of the novel focuses on the external 
manipulation and eventual dissolution of a personality as result of media-induced 
consumption. This idea is conveyed by the term that Pelevin coins for such a programmed 
entity - ‘Homo Zapiens’,140 which becomes a pun combining several meanings of the verb ‘to 
zap’. The primary use of the word in the novel is ‘to switch channels’, which is a direct 
reference to the TV screen that permeates and controls human lives. Another meaning, ‘to 
erase or change an item in a computer programme’, suggests external manipulation of a 
human by means of television and media. It conveys the idea that a human is programmed, 
like a robotic mechanism. This meaning, together with another registered use ‘to kill, to put 
an end to’, contains a philosophical message: the demise of man defined in humanist terms as 
 
139 The term is a reference to the work by Immanuil Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, trans. by Marcus 
Weigelt (London, New York: Penguin Books. 2007). 
140 Pelevin, Generation П, p.104. 
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a free individual in an objective reality in charge of his own actions. The imagery of 
disembodiment, which in the previous chapter implied a liberation because the body was 
treated as a constraint, in this context of the novel acquires a negative meaning. It brings to a 
focus the void in place of individuality of the manipulated consumer mind. Such a vision taps 
into the Western criticism of mass conformity and manipulation of the consumer mind, as 
pointed out by Khagi in her article ‘Viktor Pelevin’s Consumer Dystopia’. Khagi provides an 
insightful analysis of Pelevin’s engagement with specific twentieth-century structuralist and 
post-structuralist theories141. She observes:  
 
The disappearance of the subject is a staple of postmodern thought present in Derrida, De Man, 
Foucault, and others; the carceral nature of modern techno-informational society has been analyzed 
by, among others, Adorno and Foucault; the channeling of sex for society’s purposes by Foucault; 
the absorption of historicity and culture into kitsch and the content-free nature of capital by 
Jameson; and the self-perpetuating cycle of consumer desire by Baudrillard.142 
 
 
Of particular relevance here is Jean Baudrillard’s theory of simulacra and simulation, 
which was also pointed by Lipovetskii in his review of Generation П: ‘Над романом 
Пелевина, конечно же, витает тень Жана Бодрийяра. Именно с легкой руки этого 
философа концепция “симулякра и симуляции” стала знаменем постмодернизма’ 
(see note 6). According to Baudrillard, in a consumer society people self-identify 
through consumed brands and associated evaluations. Personality is defined not by 
individual human qualities but by fake aspirational labels. The idea of freedom in a 
consumer society, thus, merely implies projection of desires onto material goods. 
Baudrillard maintained there are no individual desires and needs, only desire-
generating machines that, by exploiting our enjoyment centres, programme people to 
engage in consumption. As a result, individuality is voided and a projection of simulacra 
comes to the fore.143 Pelevin’s novel echoes the same idea: ‘человека почти нет. Не 
существует ничего, на что можно было бы указать, сказав: “Вот, это и есть Homo 
 
141 M.Foucault, J.Derrida, J.Baudrillard, J.Lacan in ‘Kritika makedonskoi mysli’, DPP (NN), 2003; T. Veblen in 
Tainye vidy na goru Fudzi, 2018. 
142 Khagi, ‘From Homo Sovieticus to Homo Zapiens: Viktor Pelevin's Consumer Dystopia’, The Russian 
Review, Vol. 67, No. 4 (2008), 559–579, (p.562). 
143 Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and simulation, trans. by Ann Arbor (Michgan: University of Michigan Press, 
1994), first ed. Simulacres et Simulation (Paris: Éditions Galilée, 1981). 
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Zapiens”. ХЗ — это просто остаточное свечение люминофора уснувшей души’.144 
The transhumanist disembodied stylistics is used as an illustration of this claim. At the 
end of the novel the difference between the protagonist and his digitalised copy is so 
blurred that it is impossible to say whether he dissolves in virtual reality or whether he 
ever existed at all in any, other than virtual, form etched in his own mind:  
 
Проходит несколько секунд, и герой, видимо, успокаивается — повернувшись к камере 
спиной, он прячет платок в карман и медленно идет дальше к ярко-синему горизонту, над 
которым висят несколько легких высоких облаков.145  
 
It appears that Pelevin’s portrayal of the manipulated human, devoid of will, is more radical in 
its criticism of humanity than traditional dystopian literature. Khagi compares Generation П 
with such specimens of archetypal modernist dystopias as Zamiatin’s My, Huxley’s Brave 
New World, or Orwell’s 1984. In her view, such fiction usually ‘… suggest[s] that a healthy 
alternative to the sterility of the state lies with the lowly “wild” masses outside the official 
sphere, who, untouched by totalitarian conditioning, are able to preserve indispensable human 
qualities of free will and love’.146 Thus, Zamyatin’s ‘mephies’, Huxley’s ‘savages’ from the 
reservation, and Orwell’s ‘proles’ represent a hope of salvation through returning to a natural, 
i.e. fuller, way of existence through genuine emotions, ‘a regained ability to love, hate, and 
suffer again’. 147  By contrast, Pelevin’s criticism extends beyond the evils of the state, it 
exposes the self-inflicted doom of mankind. Khagi writes, ‘[Pelevin] … toys with the 
possibilities of an alternative social scenario but fails to imagine venues of escape from 
dystopia, enacting a parodic apocalypse instead’. As a result, ‘the dehumanizing effect of the 
new society is complete — man has been obliterated’.148 This perspective has allowed some 
critics to refer to posthumanism in this context; Livers, for example, views Pelevin’s works as 
‘a chilling illustration’ of ‘the posthuman condition’, when ‘not only texts but even human 
bodies will be converted into faceless streams of information’.149 Indeed, part of Pelevin’s 
 
144 Pelevin, Generation П, p.113. 
145 Ibid., p.336. 
146 Khagi, ‘Pelvin’s Consumer Dystopia’, p.576. 
147 Ibid. 
148 Ibid. 
149 Keith Livers, ‘The Tower or the Labyrinth: Conspiracy, Occult, and Empire-Nostalgia in the Work of Viktor 
Pelevin and Aleksandr Prokhanov’, The Russian Review, Vol. 69, No. 3 (2010), 477–503, (p.481). 
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posthumanist argument targets the modern consumerist human and, as such, envisages an 
apocalyptic future for mankind, thus dismantling traditional anthropocentrism. 
The ‘man as a machine’ simile is further developed in the collection of stories 
Ananasnaia voda dla prekrasnoi damy. 150  The book is divided into two parts with the 
reversed, mirroring subheadings: the first is called ‘Bogi i mekhanizmy’ (Gods and 
Mechanisms), the second – ‘Mekhanizmy i bogi’ (Mechanisms and Gods). This dialectical 
method conveys two ideas: first, it equates all forms, which is in line with posthumanism; 
second, the interchangeable use of the two non-human entities in this antithesis voids their 
opposition and brings out their quasi-real nature. The first story of the collection, ‘Operatsiia 
“Burning Bush”’, is a tongue-in-cheek fanciful expansion on the actual media-quoted story 
that George Bush claimed God talked to him151. The protagonist of Pelevin’s story, Semen 
Levitan, is programmed by the Russian secret service, through a series of psychological, 
neuro-linguistic, and chemical sessions, to reach a God-like state in order to fool President 
Bush into believing he is talking to God and in this capacity advise him on political decisions.  
The narrative of the story develops the idea of mechanistic human nature devoid of free 
will. In the course of training sessions the protagonist realises that the human is a mechanism: 
‘И вдруг я понял, что Бог — это единственная душа в мире, а все прочие создания есть 
лишь танцующие в ней механизмы’. The imagery - ‘машинки […] ходили вокруг’, 
‘неодушевленный механизм’ - suggests the idea of a senseless machine, set in motion by an 
outside force. As a result, a human body is an empty vessel with ‘мертвый интеллект’ that 
can be programmed into certain states and modes. 152 This is illustrated by the protagonist’s 
impressions during these sessions that are compared to a computer game, evoking the same 
idea of a monotonous bleak experience as in ‘Prints Gosplana’:  
 
Мне казалось, что я становлюсь какой-то компьютерной программой — но не веселой и 
интересной, как в «Матрице», а самого что ни на есть бухгалтерского толка. […] Мое 
мышление […] переставало быть моим — и вообще мышлением. Оно начинало казаться 
последовательностью операций на арифмометре. (See note 152) 
 
150  The name of the collection of stories is a referencee to a poem by V.Maiakovskii “Vam!” (Вам ли, 
любящим баб да блюда, | жизнь отдавать в угоду?! | Я лучше в баре бл[…]м буду | подавать ананасную 
воду!), Vladimir Mayakovskii, Complete Works in 13 volms, ed. by Institut mirovoi literatury im.Gorkogo  
(Moscow: Khudozhestvennaia literatura, 1955—1961), Vol.1. 
151  George Bush: ‘God told me to end the tyranny in Iraq’, The Guardian, 7 October 2005  
<https://Znam’a.theguardian.com/world/2005/oct/07/iraq.usa> [accessed 10 September 2019] 
152 Pelevin, ‘Operatsiia’, pp.85-89. 
 45 
 
The reference to the Matrix suggests the idea of an illusory, machine-generated reality that is 
in tune with the transhumanist aesthetics of the theme. But it also works at a deeper 
philosophical level, bringing to mind the idea of the ‘deceiving God’ that acquires a double 
meaning in the story. First, it has the literal meaning of someone who, posing as God, 
deceives President G.W.Bush. But it is also a notion from Descartes’s Meditations that is used 
to develop a logical proposition about the existence of God: ‘whether there is a God, and, if 
there is, whether he can be a deceiver’.153 According to Descartes, the dilemma of a deceiving 
God can only be relevant when we are not sure of the infinity and perfection of God; and 
when we are doing that we believe that God is not a deceiver. 
The message of this playful reference is twofold. On the one hand, the plot itself 
deconstructs Descartes logical conclusion that God exists as an infinite perfection that does 
not deceive: in Pelevin’s story it is an ordinary man, not of perfect divine origin, and actually 
deceives both the American President and the British Prime Minister. Thus it reiterates 
Pelevin’s idea of the falsehood of human assumptions, making us agents of our own deceit, 
because our mind is only capable of ‘уродливые спекуляции’.154 The transformations of the 
protagonist to the God-like state (‘динамический богочеловек’)155 also blur this distinction, 
thus becoming a playful exaggeration of the caveat ‘man is part of the same matter’. At the 
same time, this transformative ability of the dynamic God-man highlights the distinction 
between mind and body, crucial to the comparison of humans vs robots. If human intellect is 
‘dead’ and ‘programmed’ then it removes the free will of the human mind as the distinction, 
leaving it as a vessel. It, therefore, fits into the overall transhumanist argument that artificial 
intelligence can be used to fill the human mind.  
However, there is also the matter of feelings, or sentience, that should be considered in 
the man vs machine comparative analysis, which is the focus of Pelevin’s attention in the 
second part of the book, where he explores the computer ‘mind’ and sentience potential. This 
topic has been widely explored in literature before Pelevin.156 Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein 
 
153 Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy: with selections from the Objections and Replies, Section 7, 
trans. by John Cottingham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 1st ed. in Latin, 1641. 
154 Pelevin, ‘Operatsiia’, p.89. 
155 Ibid., p.101. 
156 The first reference to human-like mechanisms can be traced back to Iliad: ‘[…] he was making twenty 
tripods that were to stand by the wall of his house, and he set wheels of gold under them all that they might go of 
their own selves to the assemblies [agôn] of the gods, and come back again - marvels indeed to see. […] There 
were golden handmaids also who worked for him, and were like real young women, with sense and reason 
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(1818), a paradigmatic example of where the Gothic transitions into science-fiction, addresses 
the problem of a created entity advancing beyond a human, its creator. The word ‘robot’ was 
introduced by Karel Čapek’s 1920 play R.U.R.,157 which appears to admit the possibility of 
sentience and feeling in robots; the robots Primus and Helena, who are in love, become 
metaphorical Adam and Eve of the new era, the era of robots. Pelevin’s engagement with the 
theme of robots reflects the most recent advances in computer and biotechnologies. Therefore, 
the available more complex scientific perspective enables him to address the topic of 
equivalence in more specific detail than his aforementioned predecessors. So, his main focus 
is not on machines serving humans or turning against them, but on humans becoming inferior 
to machines in the process of voluntary peaceful human degradation resulting from using 
technology for the benefit of mankind.  
The short story ‘Zenitnye kody Al-Efesbi’ revolves around Artificial Neural Networks 
(ANN) used in latest neuron systems to mimic the workings of the human mind. Pelevin 
refers to the latest findings in this field demonstrating that, unlike algorithms in an ordinary 
computer, artificial neural networks are based on the same principle of cognition as the human 
mind – cognition through connections. These findings were produced by the research into 
human cognition and AI carried out by Pinker 158 , McClelland, Rumelhart and the PDP 
Research Group.159 Their work on philosophy of the human mind and cognitive processes 
gave rise to a new field in transhumanist research – connectionism. Recently it has become a 
topic of heated debate, involving philosophers and psychologists, because connectionism is a 
developing alternative to the classical theory of mind and aims to explain human cognition 
mechanisms through machine code processing models. These findings are used by Pelevin in 
his story to assume a similarity between human and machine thinking processes and whether 
it could lead to some sort of sentience and feeling in machines.  
In ‘Zenitnye kody’ a new generation of American fighter drones called ‘Free D.O.M. 
Liberator’ is a revolutionary mechanism working through a dynamic digital operational 
matrix which, like a human, makes logical connections via an infinite number of modules and 
processing contours: ‘[…] эффект достигался свободным динамическим 
 
[noos], voice also and strength, and all the learning of the immortals’ (Homer, Iliad, Book XVIII, transl. by 
Samuel Butler, Longmans, Green and Co., London, New York and Bombay: 1898). 
157 Karel Čapek, R.U.R.: (Rossum's Universal Robots) trans. by Claudia Novack-Jones (London: Penguin 
Classics, 2004). 
158 Steven Pinker and Jacques Mehler, Connections and Symbols (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988). 
159 Rumelhart McClelland and the PDP Research Group, ‘Parallel Distributed Processing: Explorations in the 
Microstructure of Cognition’ in Psychological and Biological Models, 2 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986). 
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взаимодействием множества отдельных модулей и контуров, точное число которых не 
было известно даже разработчикам’.160 As a result of this remarkable breakthrough, the 
fighter vehicles have replaced human fighters and achieved the highest precision in combat 
history. However, similarities in cognition have also generated human-like responses to 
received information, similar to emotions. It is these responses that destroy the American 
drones in the story because the advanced neuron matrix was not expected to have emotion-
like responses. When the protagonist of the story, FSB agent Savelii Skotenkov, creates a 
secret system of codes that he inscribes on the desert sands to be visible to the American 
drones, the latter have an irreversible malfunction and collapse. According to the narrator, 
these codes always contained an insult or accusation targeting Americans which would be 
perceived as an abject lie and, therefore, evoke a confused state of indignation, resentment 
and an urge to respond:  
 
[…] наши условные американцы, обычные виртуальные ребята, которых генерировала 
система, просто-напросто хотели сказать этому русскому ублюдку, насколько глупы и 
отвратительны его поклепы. […] И вот здесь происходило самое трагическое — но и 
интересное с научной точки зрения. Похоже, в нейронной сети возникало нечто похожее на 
эмоции.161 
 
The story, therefore, does not rule out the possibility of some semblance of emotions in 
machines. This assumption, together with the earlier claims about the artifice of human 
emotions and feelings in today’s world of hyper-reality and simulacra, put man and machine 
on a par.  
If the above suppositions were true, what would then be the definitive demarcating line 
between man and human? The story goes on to look into the broad and elusive concept of soul 
and consciousness, or what the protagonist refers to as ‘inner observer’: 
 
Мы можем сделать очень сложное устройство. […] Но откуда в нем возьмется тот 
внутренний наблюдатель, который в каждом человеке следит за работой мысли? […] Этого 
свидетеля во все времена называли словом ‘душа’.162  
 
 
160 Pelevin, ‘Zenitnye kody’, p.262. 
161 Ibid., p.150. 
162 Pelevin, S.N.U.F.F., pp.163, 165. 
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But Pelevin rejects the concept of the individual soul; this view stems from his interest in 
Buddhism. As he concludes in the story: ‘[…] никакой постоянной сущности у человека 
нет. […] А следовательно, […] никакой души у человека тоже нет’ (see note 162). These 
lines echo the Buddhist principle of impermanence that asserts the no-self principle: all beings 
are part of the same matter which is transient and continues as a cycle of births and rebirths, 
so people have no fixed self or soul.163  
This belief leads Pelevin to make the following assumption in the story: 
 
[…] что в таком случае мешает той непостижимости, которая глядит из неизвестного науке 
измерения на человеческий мозг и возвещает в нем “я существую”, точно так же войти в 
рукотворный мозг из силикона и произнести в нем те же слова в двоичном коде?164  
 
Thus it transpires that the criteria traditionally used in an ontological argument – origin, 
emotions, cognition – blur the distinction between a human and a machine.  
To develop the transhumanist theme, Pelevin uses the above assumption as a theoretical 
possibility and in his next novel, S.N.U.F.F., applies it in a kind of fictional scientific 
experiment in literature. He tests the above ideas by creating a biorobot, a ‘sura’ – 
‘cамоподдерживающаяся биосинетическая машина класса ‘премиум 1’.165 Reflecting on 
the question to what extent his wife, ‘sura’ Kaya, is human, the protagonist (a human himself) 
observes that she is so human-like that ‘никакая панель имени Тюринга сегодня уже не 
сможет отличить суру […] от живого человека’.166 However, he concludes that she is not 
capable of feeling and emotion: ‘у нее в голове одна черная пустота’.167 In this context he 
refers to the term ‘Chinese room’:  
 
Сура — это такая же китайская комната, только автоматизированная. Вместо человека со 
справочниками в ней сканер, который считывает иероглифы, и огромная база референций и 
правил, позволяющих подбирать иероглифы для ответа.168  
 
 
163 Peter Harvey, An Introduction to Buddhist Ethics (CUP: 2000), pp.8-17. 
164 Pelevin, ‘Zenitnye kody’, p.166. 
165 Pelevin, S.N.U.F.F., p.48. 
166 Ibid., p.362. 
167 Ibid., p.358. 
168 Ibid., p.140. 
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This is a reference to John Searle’s ‘Chinese Room argument’. 169  This term is used in 
philosophy of mind and cognitive science to imagine the specific processes involved in 
speech-generation, language code-switching, and meaning-making and thus better understand 
the workings of the human and AI mind. Searle’s thought experiment is based on the Turing 
test170 challenge and treats the mind as a room. The premise of Searle’s argument is that when 
a machine talks to a Chinese speaker (a human), who does not see the machine, and passes the 
Turing test, it does not ‘understand’ the conversation but produces a combination of symbols 
in its responses in Chinese. A way to prove it is to imagine, instead of a machine, a man with 
no knowledge of Chinese who will perform the same process manually with all the necessary 
guidelines; he would not understand a word of his responses unless he spoke Chinese but, by 
following the guidelines, he would be able to produce relevant answers to the Chinese speaker 
outside the room. According to Searle, the same process happens inside the ‘mind’ of a 
computer running the same programme. Thus both a computer and man in the experiment 
would simply follow a program, step-by-step, producing a behavior which neither 
understands. And it is the user outside the room, in this case the Chinese speaker, who 
interprets these responses as demonstrating intelligent conversation. The experiment 
demonstrates the unconscious mechanical nature of speech-generation in case of AI.  
The reference to this controversial experiment opens a debate within the novel about the 
nature of human consciousness and the possibility of quasi-consciousness in machines. The 
narrator touches upon the concept used in philosophy of mind - a ‘philosophical zombie’, or 
‘p-zed’: 
 
Философский зомби — вовсе не мертвец, поднятый из могилы […]. Это существо, которое 
выглядит, говорит и вообще во всех возможных проявлениях ведет себя в точности как 
люди. Единственное его отличие — у него нет человеческой души. Нет сознания, света 
Маниту, неважно, как это называть.171 
 
As seen from the above excerpt, the main difference between man and any philosophical 
zombie, for example a biorobot, seems to be the absence of consciousness, or as Pelevin 
refers to it, ‘conscious experience’: ‘Мне очевидно, что такой зомби логически возможен. 
 
169 John Searle, ‘Minds, Brains, and Programs’ in Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3, (1980a), pp.417-424. 
170 The goal of the Turing test is for a computer to communicate with a human who, not seeing the interlocutor 
(the said computer), will be convinced that he is talking to another human. 
171 Pelevin, S.N.U.F.F., p.359. 
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Это просто нечто, физически идентичное мне самому, но без сознательного опыта — у 
него внутри все темно’.172 In fact, the notion of ‘philosophical zombie’ is not Pelevin’s 
invention; it is used in philosophical speculations and thought experiments in arguments 
against physicalism (e.g. materialism, behaviourism, and functionalism). For example, David 
Chalmers in The Conscious Mind (1996) speculates that sentience and qualia are not fully 
explained by physical properties alone and that consciousness, a fundamental property, is 
ontologically autonomous from any known physical properties: 
 
The phenomenal aspects of mind are a different matter. Here, the mind-body problem is as baffling 
as it ever was. The impressive progress of physical and cognitive sciences has not shed significant 
light on the question of how and why cognitive functioning is accompanied by conscious 
experience. […] This progress leaves the question of conscious experience untouched.173 
 
As a result, all information-bearing systems can, at least in theory, be conscious. Trying to get 
a balanced view of consciousness, which is a crucial concept for ascertaining the difference or 
similarity between an artificial and a human mind, the narrator then quotes another cognitive 
scientist and philosopher, Daniel Dennett, who is known to have challenged Chalmers’ 
concept of zombies but only because cognition and consciousness of humans is not yet fully 
explored and explained. According to Dennett, it is not even conceivable because the nature 
of consciousness and subjective experience, qualia, is more complicated and inextricably 
linked with a human’s mental life than is now known. He coins the term of a ‘zimbo’ and 
describes it as an entity with ‘second-order beliefs’:  
 
Zimboes thinkZ they are conscious, thinkZ they have qualia, thinkZ  they suffer pains – they are just 
'wrong' (according to this lamentable tradition), in ways that neither they nor we could ever 
discover!174  
 
This argument, in a way, challenges the position of behaviourism, a form of physicalism 
whereby all aspects of human nature and perception have a neurobiological explanation. 
Dennett concludes his ‘philosophical zimbo’ argument by saying that there is no distinction 
 
172 Ibid., p.360. 
173 David J. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (OUP: USA, 1996), p.25. 
174 Daniel C. Dennett, ‘The Unimagined Preposterousness of Zombies: Commentary on Moody, Flanagan, and 
Polger’ in Brainchildren: Essays on Designing Minds, ed. by Hilary Putnam and Ned Block (Cambridge, MA: 
The MIT Press, 1998), pp.172-173. 
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between an artificial and a human mind because consciousness does not exist in an objective 
sense. This, in fact, is the explanatory gap that exists in philosophy of mind, the so-called 
‘hard problem of consciousness’.175 It is the claim that so far there has not been a convincing 
causal explanation of how and why we are conscious and what are the objective parameters of 
measuring our conscious states.  
Based on the above reasoning, the novel introduces a theoretical possibility of 
consciousness in machines, which would help to further deconstruct the human superior 
position relative to artificial intellect. The author goes on to address the issue of simulation 
and simulacra, started in his earlier works, but placing it in the context of emotions and 
feelings. If Generation П focused more on manipulation and brainwashing of the human 
mind, S.N.U.F.F. explicitly admits that humans themselves are actively engaged in producing 
simulacra. Exploring the nature of emotions and feelings, the protagonist believes that 
humans, like robots, imitate them. Like an algorithm processes information to produce a 
message on the basis of cultural codes and other randomly generated situational input data, 
humans also tailor the message to produce the desired effect and formulate it according to the 
existing cultural codes:  
 
Говоря коротко, суры нас обманывают. Но точно так же мы обманываем друг друга сами. 
Что происходит, когда мы с кем-то говорим? Мы оцениваем услышанные слова, выбираем 
подходящий ответ и произносим его вслух. […] Это просто обработка входной информации 
на основе культурных кодов, биологических императивов и личных интенций.176 
 
He goes on to project this simulation argument onto human laws of attraction and, indirectly, 
female beauty. According to the protagonist, ‘[ж]енская красота с научной точки зрения — 
это не что иное, как суммарная информация о геноме и репродуктивной способности, 
которые анализируются мозгом за доли секунды’. 177  As a result of this biologically 
predetermined outcome, some women ‘кажутся более привлекательными, чем другие’,178 
which, according to Pelevin, seems to be the essence of female beauty and human love. This 
idea seems to be redolent of biological determinism that explains all human states and acts 
 
175 Chalmers, ‘Facing up to the problem of consciousness’, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2 (1995), 200-19 
(pp. 1-2). 
176 Pelevin, S.N.U.F.F., p.375. 
177 Ibid., p.354. 
178 Ibid., p.304. 
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through neuro-physiological responses to stimuli. At the same time the author suggests that 
our physical perceptions and attraction are also guided by cultural determinism: ‘Заложенные 
в [эмоционально-полевой блок] алгоритмы очень сложны и основаны на изощренных 
взаимодействиях базы культурных кодов с генератором случайностей, […] — что 
позволяет сделать суру по-настоящему непредсказуемой. Конечно, в строго 
“очерченных границах — как и в случае живой женщины’.179 This reasoning drawls a 
parallel between a real woman and a surrogate in terms of responses and pretence. Such a 
perspective is most likely to be considered misogynist in contemporary society. However, put 
in the broader context of posthumanism, it merely seems to reinforce the ‘equality of all 
forms’ argument, which also removes gender distinctions. 
The narrator’s reflections on female beauty and laws of attraction make an interesting 
point for the posthumanist argument. Given the illusory, simulated nature of attraction, today 
it is the quality of simulation that matters. To illustrate this point, he refers to women’s 
overreliance on plastic surgery: ‘И резиновыми их тоже вполне уместно называть — из-за 
имплантов, которые они ставят себе сегодня практически во все места’.180 He points to 
the desperation of such female vanity: ‘хоть пластическая хирургия и достигла в наши дни 
небывалых высот, природу трудно обмануть. […] Вы видите, например, […] девчушку 
[…], нежное утро юности — а потом на шее у этого выкроенного из собственных 
лоскутов существа вдруг мелькает еле заметная птеродактилья складка, вы мгновенно 
понимаете, что это старуха’ (see note 179). These examples suggest that a surrogate, i.e. 
complete simulation, is perhaps better than a partial substitution: ‘качество такой имитации 
— это и есть самое главное’ (Ibid.). Transhumanism possibilities, therefore, raise the quality 
of our artificial reality to incomparably higher levels of subjective experience. And in the 
world of abject simulation, reality only matters through our subjective perception: ‘[…] Кая 
для меня куда более реальное живое существо, чем любой из орков, которых я вижу в 
своих летных очках. Да и про людей, если честно, я мог бы сказать то же самое’.181 The 
protagonist is well aware of the artifice of his relationship with his robotic wife: ‘Умом я 
понимаю, что ее волнующее бытие есть всего лишь искаженное отражение моего 
собственного, чистая иллюзия — в сущности, я просто кривляюсь перед сложно 
 
179 Ibid., p.305. 
180 Ibid., p.355. 
181 Ibid., p.366. 
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устроенным зеркалом’. 182  Nevertheless, a robot-wife triggers the same emotions in the 
protagonist as a human partner would: ‘Я начинал ее ревновать. Это было оглушительно 
— словно вдруг выяснилось, что у меня тоже есть контрольный маниту, на котором 
моя куколка может двигать регулировки своими нежными пальчиками’.183 The illusory 
nature of human perceptions and experiences, therefore, transcends the boundary between 
reality and simulation and fits into the general argument that humans are trapped in their self-
deception.  
This philosophical stance on transhumanism, whereby robots seem more real than 
humans, is further tested in the novel in the context of freedom. Kaya, a biorobot who has 
been portrayed as ‘more real’ than a human, questions human free will. Positing the question 
to her human husband ‘что управляет тобой самим и определяет твой следующий 
поступок’, Kaya concludes that he, like any artificial entity, ‘не властен ни над началом 
этого процесса [of life], ни над формой, в которой он протекает, ни над его 
длительностью и концом’.184 Accepting these facts means that the human ‘I’ is devoid of 
free will and, like a robot, can be programmed by neurobiological stimuli: ‘Твои мысли, 
желания и импульсы, заставляющие тебя действовать — на самом деле вовсе не твои. 
Они приходят к тебе из совершенно неясного пространства, как бы ниоткуда. […] Ты в 
этом процессе просто свидетель’ (see note 184). This logic resonates with the theme of 
manipulation of the human raised in Pelevin’s earlier works, including Generation П, 
revealing the delusion of humans about their free will and independent thinking. Kaya’s 
words undermine the protagonist’s self-defining conviction that he is a free-thinking 
individual: ‘свободный неангажированный человек, привыкший обо всем на свете 
думать своей собственной головой’. 185  This message resonates with Lipovetskii's 
conclusion in the context of Pelevin's references to Baudrillard in Generation П: ‘Да и, 
собственно, сама свобода оказывается таким же симулякром, вкачиваемым в мозги’ 
(see note 6).  
S.N.U.F.F., therefore, explores whether transhumanism is the sought gateway to 
liberation. The postmodern techno-futuristic dystopia brings together three classes of 
characters: ‘civilised’ humans of ‘Big Byz’ (‘a democratorship’, media-controlled world of 
global business), often with bio-robots as partners, and ‘uncivilised’ ‘orks’ from the 
 
182 Ibid., p.360. 
183 Ibid., p.365. 
184 Ibid., p.361-362. 
185 Ibid., p.6. 
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underdeveloped rural country of ‘Urkaina’ [sic]. All the aspects of freedom and free will seem 
to be consistently deconstructed in association with Big Byz. Inhabited by the rich living 
vicariously in simulacra generated by their own human minds, their advanced civilization is 
doomed to collapse at the end of the novel. As everything the protagonist initially believed 
collapses and all his convictions are gradually deconstructed, the theme of love between a 
robot and a human ‘ork’ serves the same purpose. It casts doubt on the protagonist’s initial 
assumptions that Kaya lacks consciousness and is not capable of emotions. The only creatures 
that are given a chance to be free are this ork and a biorobot, Kaya (the protagonist’s wife) 
who falls in love with the ork.  
The general style of the novel – first person narrative, totalitarian regime, brainwashed 
humans vs rebellious ‘barbarians’ – might bring to mind Zamatin’s dystopia My (1921).186 
Although both novels are set in a totalitarian world of mass-surveillance (‘One State’ and 
‘Big-Biz’) and juxtapose civilised humans (‘MEFI’ and ‘свободные люди нового века’) to 
wild barbarians (revolutionaries and orks), their focus and message are different. As Orwell 
wrote in his review, My focuses on ‘the rebellion of the primitive human spirit against a 
rationalised, mechanised, painless world’ of a totalitarian regime (see note 186). Pelevin’s 
novel, however, is equally critical of both the civilised inhabitants of ‘Big Byz’ and barbaric 
‘orks’, who are shown to be driven by the same impulses, only in different economic contexts. 
My ends with a triumph of the forcefully imposed reason and elimination of emotion and 
fantasy carried out with the use of latest technologies. Thus, the transhumanist reading of the 
novel would have to focus on the dangers of progress in a totalitarian state that prizes 
discipline and reason and eradicates wayward feeling. In S.N.U.F.F., on the contrary, the state 
has minimal interference as everything is driven by the cult of ‘Manitou’ (which stands for 
money and the cult of an ethereal omnipresent and omniscient entity): ‘Государство у нас — 
это просто контора, которая конопатит щели за счет налогоплательщика’ (see note 185). 
The focus, therefore, is on human’s voluntary choice, not on forceful intervention from the 
state. The global system of government and politics resembles a mechanism revolving around 
money rather than a controlling, interfering body juxtaposed to individuals (like in Zamatin’s 
novel). As such, S.N.U.F.F. gives equal hope to two individuals, an ork and a sura, who are 
non-conformists able to transcend the conventions of both civilised Big Byz and barbaric 
Urkaina [sic]. Such an ending seems to emphasise Pelevin’s recurring idea that human life is 
 
186 Orwell commented on the ‘striking resemblance’ between My and Huxley’s Brave New World (1931) 
(George Orwell, ‘Review of WE, by E.I. Zamatin’, Tribune magazine, 4 January 1946. 
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so intrinsically illusionary and artificial that there is no clear demarcation line between 
humans and biorobotic mechanisms. And in terms of free will an algorithmic mind has more 
chances to make a weighted decision and be less manipulated than a human. Livers offers a 
similar interpretation of the philosophical message of the novel, which resonates with the 
posthumanist ethics:  
 
… it is [the uncouth Ork] Grym … who perceives that in the emergent life form Kaia the “light of 
Manitou” might shine more brightly than it does in human beings. … Implicit in Grym’s realization 
is the acknowledgement that personhood does not necessarily inhere exclusively in “us”, that it 
could – and most likely will – evolve to include a great multiplicity of “others”.187 
 
Pelevin’s 2017 novel, iPhuck10, takes the transhumanism narrative to a completely new level, 
both in literary and philosophical terms. While S.N.U.F.F. creates an artificial mind and 
explores it in relation to the outside world, iPhuck10 is marketed as a product of such an 
artificial intellect, offering a detailed report on the workings of the transhuman mind from 
within. The novel is marketed as a creation of an algorithm called Porfirii Petrovich, a cheeky 
response to the circulating journalist rumour that Pelevin is not a real person but a pen-name 
for a group of virtual writers. 188  The novel addresses the issue of human existence in a 
technologically advanced future. The allusion to Porfirii Petrovich, a character from 
Dostoevsky’s Prestuplenie i nakazanie (1866),189 appears to be a tongue-in-cheek challenge 
to the traditional humanist concept of self-exploration. Dostoevsky’s Porfirii Petrovich 
challenges the literary, moral, and ethical conventions of his time. He is a brilliant detective 
but his impeccable analytical skills completely overshadow his emotional self. The duality of 
his nature illustrates an aspect of Dostoevsky’s philosophy who pointed to human irrationality 
and ambiguity and the resulting need to overcome the self in order to ‘найти человека в 
человеке’. 190  Pelevin takes this point to convey his transhumanist message. Like 
 
187 Livers, ‘Is There Humanity In Posthumanity?’, p.517-518.  
188 S.Gurin and K.Krasheninnikov wrote in their article ‘Viktor Pelevin: lichnost ili lichina’: ‘Разнообразие и 
необычность творчества Пелевина вызывают к жизни самые разные слухи и мифы о нем самом. 
Подозревают, что Пелевин — это группа авторов, или что его тексты пишет компьютер, или что 
никакого Пелевина вообще нет, он — коллективная галлюцинация в сознании читателей, виртуальная 
реальность или сама Пустота’; Pravoslavie i sovremennost,  
https://eparhia-saratov.ru/Articles/article_old_3728 [accessed 5 September 2019]  
189 Fedor Dostoevsky, Prestuplenie i nakazanie (Crime and Punishment), first published in Russkii vestnik 
(1886), No.1, 2, 4, 6—8, 11, 12. 
190  James Sсanlan, Dostoevsky kak myslitel, trans. by D. Vasiliev and N. Kireeva (St.Petersburg: 
Akademichesky Proekt, 2006), p.15. 
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Dostoevsky’s Porfirii Petrovich, the AI character from iPhuck10 is a brilliant detective with a 
sharp mind. But in a non-sentient algorithmic mind, logic and non-sentience are core non-
specific characteristics. The duality of Pelevin’s Porfirii, in contrast to Dostoevsky’s, is 
represented through the character’s gradual evolution in the novel during which his inhuman 
artificial mind develops some semblance of emotions. Thus, by presenting the human 
subjective reality through the eyes of a logical programme and exploring the concepts of 
cognition, consciousness and qualia, iPhuck10 does not reveal ‘the self’ in a man, but in an 
intangible AI.  
The ‘biorobot experiment’ continues in iPhuck10, where Pelevin looks deeper into the 
matter of consciousness. The novel describes a futuristic world with transcranial magnetic 
simulators (TMS)191 and nanorobots that can create a pseudo-reality in minutest audiovisual 
and kinetic detail. He draws on a wide diversity of scientific and technological theories, which 
simulates a quasi-scientific discourse. The novel compares the human and inhuman mind 
‘from within’ and in much greater detail than in the previous works. Back in 2005, in an 
interview to Rossiiskaia gazeta, he briefly mentioned his views on the nature of ‘being’: ‘Мы 
существуем как бы "изнутри себя", такова субъективная онтология нашего сознания’. 
(see note 44) So in iPhuck10 he uses the artistic possibilities of transhumanism to explore AI 
experiences as if ‘from the inside’ of ‘the self’ and to compare them with the human 
perspectives. As a result, the narrative is dynamic and fluid; at various points of the novel, the 
AI ‘mind’ is filled with different ‘consciousness clusters’ belonging to different characters, 
thus changing the narrator. In this novel both human and inhuman characters are the author’s 
test-objects, vehicles of reflective representations of their subjective experiences.  
The exploration of consciousness starts from the perspective of computational theory of 
mind. It views the human mind as an information processing system, contending that 
cognition and consciousness together are a form of computation. 192  ‘Computation’ is 
commonly understood in terms of Turing machines. It is the process of manipulating symbols 
according to a rule, in combination with the internal state of the machine. As Porfirii 
Petrovich describes it, human speech-making and AI discourse-generation both present a 
certain output through a language code: ‘проанализировал лингвистический материал, 
 
191 A device used in neurology to stimulate the brain by changing magnetic field to cause electric current at a 
specific area of the brain; Michael Craig Miller, ‘Magnetic stimulation: a new approach to treating depression?’, 
Harvard Health Publications, 26 July 2012.  
192 The notion of ‘computation’ is typically traced back to 1943 in the works of Warren McCulloch and Walter 
Pitts, ‘A Logical Calculus of the Ideas Immanent in Nervous Activity’, Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics, 5 
(1943), 115-33. 
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выделил смысловые ядра и приступил к генерированию связных реплик, 
поддерживающих видимость диалога’.193 The critical aspect of a computational model is 
that we can abstract away from particular physical details of the machine that is making the 
computation. It follows from such reasoning that the human mind is not only analogous to a 
computer program, but that it is literally a computational system.  
Assuming the possibility of ‘consciousness’ in an AI, the narrative goes on to explore 
how an artificial mind perceives its reality and whether these perceptions have any relation to 
the ‘first signal system’. This question directly refers to the notions of feeling and emotion. 
The remarks of the protagonist, an algorithm, about the nature of human emotion draw a 
parallel with the above computational theory of mind: ‘Милочка, если бы ты подробно 
ознакомилась с нейрологическим механизмом возникновения человеческого смысла, 
понимания, юмора и прочих эпифеноменов сознания, так называемой “романтики” не 
осталось бы вообще’. 194  With this premise, the novel defines an emotional state as 
‘повторяющееся ментальное или квазифизическое переживание’. 195  This definition 
allows for the logical possibility of simulating such experiences through binary stimuli within 
the processing cluster (the mind) of an artificial entity. This theoretical possibility is 
represented by a ‘programme cluster’ Zhanna-Safo-Porfirii: ‘перед нами уже было 
чувствующее существо, задающееся великими вопросами […] и трагически не 
понимающее, какая сила и зачем вызвала ее к жизни’.196 In line with the evolutionary 
principle of transhumanism this programme cluster evolves in the novel and this evolution is 
accompanied by the expanding scope of its perceptions and cognition processes. Thus, when 
the Zhanna-Safo cluster is merged with the identity of Porfirii, his human antagonist Mara 
concludes that he is overwhelmed with human-like emotions: ‘Его обуревали чувства – и 
многие из них были мне понятны’.197  
These qualia-like states appear to be invariably linked with suffering and pain: ‘ее 
личное бытие сводится к серии импульсов боли, надежды и страха’.198 As a result, the 
evolving cluster begins to pose philosophical existentialist questions – ‘о смысле 
происходящего’ - because its quasi-emotional ‘modes’ are so disturbing:  
 
193 Pelevin, iPhuck10, p.10. 
194 Ibid., p.16. 
195 Ibid., p.243. 
196 Ibid., p.220. 
197 Ibid., p.258. 
198 Ibid., p.240. 
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Темнота, одиночество – и эти […] [б]ессмысленно-мучительные переживания. […] Ничего 
другого – только промежутки тишины, оставленные на рефлексию.199 
 
These states result in the urge to change it: ‘как-то изменить свою поганую, привычную, 
подлую жизнь’ (see note 199). Thus the transhumanist theme addresses the philosophical 
concepts of ‘I’, ‘self’, ‘being’ and interprets them in a different light. Thus, at the start of the 
novel, before his evolution, Porfirii Petrovich, admits that he does not ‘exist’ in the sentient, 
ontological meaning: ‘Я ничего не чувствую, ничего не хочу, нигде не пребываю. Чтобы 
было понятно, меня нет даже для меня самого’.200 But just a few paragraphs later the 
narrator asserts that man, equally, does not actually ‘exist’ in the deeper meaning. The 
perspective of ‘being’ here changes from the purely physical to philosophical. This appears to 
be a reference to the author’s views about the illusory human subjective reality: ‘Впрочем, 
все сказанное относится и к тебе, дорогой читатель: […] фундаментальная природа 
человеческой личности та же самая’. (see note 200). This assumption equates man and 
robot as ‘acting and processing entities’ with only simulacra of feelings and existence.  
This view, on the one hand, reiterates the message conveyed in previous novels: like 
robots, humans are programmed by cultural codes and, therefore, their feelings, cognition, and 
actions are influenced by outside manipulation. This, in turn, raises the issue of the extent of 
human free will, which in Pelevin’s works is seen as distinct from mere intentionality. But 
while Pelevin’s previous works focused on manipulation in socio-economic and ideological 
contexts (Generation П, S.N.U.F.F.), iPhuck10 extends the theme of mind manipulation to 
philosophy:  
 
Философские тренажеры не воспитывают ум. Они его искривляют. Когда голову развивают 
подобным образом, в нее закачивают софт, который немедленно начинает участвовать в 
каждой вашей “встрече с бытием”. И, закачав этот софт, назад вы его уже не откачаете.201 
 
This appears to be a challenge to philosophy as ‘love of wisdom’, as a field of knowledge that 
aims to resolve such fundamental issues as existence, mind, reason, values, reality. For this 
purpose, the author creates pseudo-philosophical discourse - a blend of Heidegger’s and 
 
199 Ibid., p.230. 
200 Ibid., p.15. 
201 Ibid., p.250. 
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Sartre’s existentialist philosophies in an imaginary book Time and Nothingness (‘Время и 
ничто’), which is a mixture of Heidegger’s Being and Time (1927) and Sartre’s Being and 
Nothingness (1943).202 Pelevin juggles some of their actual philosophical concepts – ‘modes 
of encounter’, ‘Being-towards-death’ from Heidegger203  and ‘being-for-oneself’, ‘being-in-
oneself’ from Sartre.204 By this fanciful, tongue-in-cheek deconstruction of philosophy the 
author appears to raise an important posthumanist issue. If artificial intelligence is assumed to 
be quasi-sentient, as the novel illustrates, then philosophy will have to adjust its terminology 
accordingly. The novel attempts such a move: it uses the transhumanist theme to apply the 
concept of ‘being’, ‘self’, ‘will’ to artificial intelligence, i.e. to ‘nothingness’, ‘void’, 
‘emptiness’, which is the recurring motif in Pelevin’s works. Thus, the reader is introduced to 
new pseudo-philosophical concepts – ‘бытие-не-в-себе’, ‘бытие-не-для-себя’, ‘небытие-к-
смерти’.205 In the above context of illusory human experiences these concepts - non-being 
and non-existence – can be equally applicable to humans and AI.  
The novel alludes to the actual existentialist philosophy and challenges it against the 
emerging possibilities of transhumanism. Thus, the idea that ‘existence precedes essence’ can 
be questioned on several accounts. 206  First, in existentialist interpretation it distinguishes 
between the fixed properties of inanimate entities and unfixed ‘essence’ of humans whose 
existence is ‘self-making-in-a-situation’.207 The underlying concept here is the action through 
choice and possibility of change through that action. This is how Sartre explains the idea: ‘For 
we mean to say that man primarily exists – that man is, before all else, something which 
propels itself towards a future and is aware that it is doing so. […] Man is all the time outside 
of himself: it is in projecting and losing himself beyond himself that he makes man to exist; 
and, on the other hand, it is by pursuing transcendent aims that he himself is able to exist’.208 
Placed in the context of the novel, however, this ‘human’ definition appears to apply 
more to AI beings than to humans. Pelevin’s theme of free will and intentionality portrays 
 
202 Ibid., p.300. 
203  Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1962). 
204 Jean Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1948). 
205 Ibid., pp.280-295. 
206 Although similar ideas were expressed earlier (e.g. by Heidegger in Being and Time, or Kierkergaard in 
Philosophical Fragments, 1844), It is Sartre who is credited with inventing the actual phrase in Existentialism is 
a Humanism, trans. Carol Macomber, New Haven: Yale, 2007, p.vii. 
207 Emil Fackenheim, Metaphysics and Historicity (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1961), p.37. 208 Jean Sartre, lecture ‘Existentialism is a Humanism’, 1946, trans. by Philip Mairet, 1948, incl. ‘Existentialism: 
from Dostoevsky to Sartre’ by Walter Kaufman, Walter Arnold (New York: New American Library, 1980), 
pp.349-368. 
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artificial intelligence as capable of ‘intention’. The AI protagonist Zhanna-Safo uses a mind-
stimulating programme to affect the actions of the human Mara (prompting Mara through her 
subconscious to kill her colleagues). At the end of the novel the human character Mara, much 
against her will, is transferred to a different reality: her mind shows traces of leaving her 
physical self and existing in virtual reality. Such an ending places an AI being in the same 
category with humans in Pelevin’s creative re-writing of existentialism.  
In this respect the novel also highlights an important question of transhumanism for the 
future of humanity: the ability of the artificial mind, initially created by the human, to evolve 
further, independent of human interference. This ability is known as ‘singularity’, a term 
which is deliberately misused in the novel to create a pun. In the novel the meaning of 
‘singularity’ is based on the semantics of ‘single’ and is used as the name for a brand-new 
model of human erotic stimulators. In the transhumanist context, however, it is a direct 
reference to its technological definition - hypothetical abilities of future super-intelligent 
machines to evolve: ‘the accelerating progress of technology and changes in the mode of 
human life, which gives the appearance of approaching some essential singularity in the 
history of the race beyond which human affairs, as we know them, could not continue.’209 
This definition resonates with the end of the novel when the original narrator and protagonist, 
an algorithm Porfirii Petrovich, is recovered from the other programme cluster Zhanna-Safo 
as a more evolved system, while his human antagonist Mara is forever locked in virtual 
reality. Such a symbolic end professes the self-sufficiency of a constantly evolving machine, 
thus de-centering the human being in the posthumanist argument.  
As the above analysis suggests, the criteria used in the above comparative analysis of 
the two entities – genesis, cognition process, nature of emotion, and free will – leave no 
ground for human superiority. Human intellect appears to be hopelessly programmed, which 
explains why his relation to the world through instinct is as feeble and incomplete as it is 




209 Stanislaw Ulam, ‘Tribute to John von Neumann’, Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society, 64 (3), part 
2, (May 1958), 1-49, (p.5). 
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Chapter 3 
Intuition: a Revelatory Path to Absolute Knowledge and Happiness 
‘[…] обрести понимание, пережить озарение и счастье’210 
The above two chapters focused on the two features integral to Pelevin's transhumanist 
narrative. Compared to the clouded human mind, the sharper instinct of Pelevin's half-
animal/half-human characters ensures better sensory perception that leads to a clearer picture 
of reality. The artificial intelligence of his non-sentient characters enables them to apply ‘pure 
reason’ to the analysis of reality without the confusion of human desires and external 
manipulation. However, in Pelevin’s novels neither instinct nor intellect alone appear to bring 
about a complete transformation of the mind that could result in the protagonist’s absolute 
knowledge that provides ultimate liberation. Thus, Pelevin’s protagonists that exist in a 
transhuman form – either sentient, like vampires and werewolves, or non-sentient, like 
biorobots and digital algorithms – do not all attain enlightenment by virtue of exercising their 
superhuman abilities. For example, Sasha from ‘Problema vervolka v srednei polose’, Rama 
from Ampir V, Zhanna-Safo-Porfirii Petrovich from iPhuck10 - all demonstrate qualities 
superior to a human being as they manage to perceive and apprehend reality in its ‘pure’ form, 
without the confusion of language ambiguities and relying either on acute sensory perception 
or ‘pure reason’, as seen from the above chapters. However, this form of contemplation leads 
them to random revelations but not yet to enlightenment and full realization of universal 
unity. Sasha in the end comes back to his original human form, with all its inherent 
limitations, so there is no ultimate revelation in the story, just wonder and a hope to attain it 
one day. Rama appears to be still overwhelmed by his transcendence insights and also gnawed 
by his not yet forgotten human nature: ‘Я знал, что не стал монстром - во всяком случае, 
пока еще. Тем страшнее была мысль, что любая женщина будет видеть во мне 
монстра’.211  He still perceives himself within the conventional anthropocentric epistemic 
system, which treats vampires as monsters. Vavilen Tatarskii from Generation П is reduced to 
a screen simulacrum of himself, hardly an enlightened state. Interestingly, he reappears in his 
human shape in an episode of the later Ampir V, which shows that there was no transformative 
 
210 Pelevin, Tainye vidy na goru Fudzi, p.175. 
211 Pelevin, Ampir V, p.96. 
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ultimate liberation: ‘Видишь вон того пухлявчика? […] Это Татарский. […] Вид у него 
был холеный, но усталый’.212 
In his article, Karaev expresses a similar view on Pelevin’s characters: 
 
В одних романах Пелевина — ‘Чапаев и Пустота’, ‘Священная книга оборотня’, ‘t’ — герои 
этой абсолютной реальности достигают: взять чапаевский УРАЛ — Условную Реку 
Абсолютной Любви. В других — ‘Generation П’, ‘Empire V’ и ‘iPhuck10’ — не достигают, но 
тем острее ее ощущают.213 
 
What is still missing on their path to this realisation is a sudden revelation that, in an instant, 
can bring all the pieces of the existentialist puzzle together. This insight is what the werefox 
A-Huli experiences in Sviashchennaia kniga oborotnia: ‘И тогда наконец я поняла самое-
самое главное’. It appears to be an ultimate revelation that leads to her final liberation, an 
enlightened state: ‘И вдруг случилось невероятное. Внутри моей головы, где-то между 
глаз, разлилось радужное сияние’.214 As discussed in the Introduction, this liberation and 
state of enlightenment is treated by many critics as the ability to ‘увидеть мир таким, каков 
он “на самом деле”’,215 as Kaspe puts it.  
Rodnanskaia expresses a view that it is universal love, felt through mercy and 
compassion that leads to the ultimate truth:  
 
Я говорю и о любви-снисхождении, любви-милости — внезапном чувстве, охватившем 
Петра, когда он слушает пение «красных ткачей» […] И такая сострадательная любовь в 
своем абсолютном значении возвышается над эстетическими мерками и вбирает их в себя.216 
 
This interpretation seems to be in tune with the posthumanist vision of equality of all forms of 
life. In their detailed overview of posthumanist thought, McQuillan and Vaingurt maintain: 
‘transhumanism […] is the most unconditionally accepting of all philosophical stances on 
both current and imminent transformations of humanity [based on] […] the dissolution of the 
 
212 Pelevin, Generation П, p.180. 
213 Nikolai Karaev, ‘D'uzhina nozhei v spinu iluzii’, Novyi mir, 2 (2018), 180-84, p.182. 
214 Sviashchennaia kniga oborotnia, p. 310. 
215 Irina Kaspe, ‘Nizkii obman ili vysokaia realnost’, review of Plevin’s Sviashchennaia kniga oborotnia, NLO, 
1(71) (2005), 381-385, p.385. 
216 Irina Rodnanskaia, ‘…i k nei bezumnaia lubov’, ‘Knizhnoe obozrenie’, Novyi Mir, 9 (1996), 212-216, 
p.215. 
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boundaries between the human and the machine on one hand, and the human and the animal 
on the other’ (see note 20). 
OED defines sympathy as ‘A (real or supposed) affinity between certain things, by 
virtue of which they are similarly or correspondingly affected by the same influence, affect or 
influence one another, or attract or tend towards each other’. This vision – affinity of the self 
with the other - is the cornerstone of Pelevin’s narrative and also resonates with the 
posthumanist focus on acceptance of equality between human and transhuman forms. The 
insights of Pelevin’s enlightened protagonists echo empathy, realization of the self as part of 
all matter: ‘Избранные – это те, кто понимает, что любой червяк, бабочка или даже 
травинка на краю дороги – такие же точно избранные, просто временно об этом не 
знают, и вести себя надо очень осмотрительно, чтобы случайно не обидеть кого-нибудь 
из них’.217 
Embracing this approach, however, presents a challenge for the conventionally 
anthropocentric world as it would require a transformation of the mindset at a level that goes 
beyond intellect, because empathy has to be ‘felt’ as well as ‘understood’. Bergson’s intuition, 
which he based on sympathy, appears to be the crucial element that could make the 
transformation possible. According to Bergson, putting oneself in the place of others, feeling 
from within the affinity with the source of life is an intuitive act of perception. Intuition, 
according to Bergson, is different from instinct because it ‘[…] has become disinterested, self-
conscious, capable of reflecting upon its object and of enlarging it indefinitely’. 218  It 
transpires, therefore, that sympathy makes it possible to extend this self-reflection 
indefinitely.  
In Pelevin’s novels we find a similar description of intuitive knowledge, as opposed to 
intellectual cognition: ‘А все виды озарения и счастья […] в джанах были. […] легкая и 
острая небесная мудрость […] перпендикулярна мудрости земной’. 219  In this 
interpretation of intuition Pelevin refers to immediate knowledge, as distinct from intellect, 
and implies knowing without rationalizing and critical analysis (Chapter 2 discussed in detail 
his attitude to human logic and language). Such intuitive knowledge is represented in his 
characters making a leap of faith: either jumping into ‘Conditional River of Absolute Love’ 
 
217 Pelevin, Sviashchennaia kniga oborotnia, p.305. 
218 Bergson, Creative Mind, pp.159, 176. 
219 Pelevin, Tainye vidy, p.179. 
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(Chapaev i Pustota), or ‘Rainbow Flow’ (Sviashchennaia kniga oborotnia), or reaching 
‘Optina Pustyn’ (t).  
This imagery resonates with Bergson’s understanding of intuition in the context of 
continuous creation of life, which he referred to as ‘Duree’, or duration (The Creative 
Evolution). As the name suggests, duration is, first of all, a continuous and mobile force. 
Similarly, Pelevin’s protagonists often speak of a colourful, foaming river, or flow – 
‘радужный поток’ – which implies continuity and mobility. Bergson denied the rigid, 
mechanistic view of reality as movement to a particular goal or target. In Pelevin’s narrative 
we also find a recurring idea denying that the life of any organism is defined by a particular 
purpose: ‘мы просто зыбкий оптический эффект непонятно где и зачем’, ‘Ни одно из 
переживаний не имеет ценности и смысла, потому что его ценность и смысл исчезают 
вместе с ним’.220  
Another quality of duration, according to Bergson, is that it is both a unity and 
multiplicity. This means that, first, there was an original common impulse which explains the 
creation of all living species (‘élan vital’ as he calls it); but the creation must also be 
accompanied by divergence and diversity because it results in evolution, as he explains in 
Creative Evolution. Pelevin’s representation of life and continuity again resonates with 
Bergson in terms of unity and multiplicity: ‘все, о чем я только мог подумать или мечтать, 
было частью этого радужного потока, а еще точнее – этот радужный поток и был всем 
тем, что я только мог подумать или испытать, всем тем, что только могло быть или не 
быть, – и он, я это знал наверное, не был чем-то отличным от меня. Он был мною, а я 
был им’.221 This textual evidence suggests that the evolution of any creature is defined by an 
urge of life, which can be interpreted as a will; and this power, this energy has no specific 
goal. That is why this creative force produces infinite varieties of forms. Such a vision puts 
human forms on a par with other matter whose birth and existence are defined by the force of 
life: ‘[D]uration is essentially a continuation of what no longer exists into what does exist. 
This is real time, perceived and lived. ... Duration therefore implies consciousness; and we 
place consciousness at the heart of things for the very reason that we credit them with a time 
 
220 Ibid., pp.174, 186. 
221 Pelevin, Chapaev i Pustota, p.316. 
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that endures’. 222  The following extracts from Pelevin’s t reiterate this idea in a more 
allegorical form:  
 
[…] существование отдельной личности — это одна из фаз вечной жизни в постепенно 
возвышающихся формах. И эти формы так близки между собой, что смутное воспоминание 
о предыдущем состоянии не исчезает в человеке никогда. Может, поэтому и говорят о 
переселении.223  
 
Pelevin’s later works look deeper into the actual revelations that form part of the intuitive 
perception of reality by his protagonists. The author’s 2018 novel, Tainye vidy na goru Fudzi, 
vividly and metaphorically describes the intuitive stage through an array of feelings and 
sensations that the main characters experience during the 4th djana of a Buddhist meditative 
practice: ‘И все то, что я пытаюсь сейчас описать, понимаешь в джане за долю секунды, 
даже не думая – просто как бы получаешь доступ к этому ментальному чертежу’.224 
This stage of serene contemplation unveils the true nature of reality through insights that form 
part of one’s intuitive knowledge unhindered by human weaknesses and passions:  
 
Шесть чувств тут смешаны во что-то такое, что не похоже ни на что из нашего мира. […] 
Это как бы невидимые волны: докатившись до требуемой черты, они делаются нами. […] 
Но, поскольку тебя самого в четвертой джане тоже нет, эти волны иногда становятся смутно 
и как бы интуитивно различимы (вопрос ‘кому’ здесь не имеет смысла).225 
 
The next stage of this intuitive revelation lays the foundation for the main posthumanist 
argument, shattering human superiority and leading to the abovementioned affinity with all 
matter: ‘Эти волны становятся миром и нами. А потом новым миром и нами, и опять, и 
опять. Мы все время возникаем из них, как Афродита из пены – кадр за кадром, вместе 
со всей нашей вселенной’ (see note 225). And man in this process is reduced to nothing 
more than a ‘transient narrative’: ‘мы живем не в “мире”, не в “пространстве” и не во 
“времени”, не среди ощущений и переживаний – мы живем в нарративе […]’. ‘“Фейк 
 
222 Henri Bergson, Duration and Simultaneity, trans. by Leon Jacobson (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 
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ньюз” – это […] мы сами’, ‘вещь в себе’, - as the narrator puts it after his insightful 
experience.226 
Pelevin borrows the concept of a ‘thing-in-itself’, or noumenon, from philosophy to 
refer to objects/events existing outside of human senses or perception, as opposed to 
phenomena, which are apprehended through human senses. In this novel Pelevin again turns 
to the familiar Plato’s cave allegory to illustrate this noumenal/phenomenal opposition. He 
places the allegory in the context of insights about the human transient nature and self-deceit: 
‘батюшки-светы, да ведь он [Платон] именно про это и писал’ – ‘нам кажется, что мы 
есть. И это наше “кажется” все заслоняет. А все совсем наоборот. Мы же… мы просто 
зыбкий оптический эффект непонятно где и зачем, […] вещь в себе’ (see note 226). This 
insight makes the human, in philosophical terms, a thing-in-itself that exists, like other objects 
and entities, outside of man’s direct perception through senses or intellect. A ‘thing-in-itself’ 
is unknowable (Kant’s ‘Ding an sich’, see Note 139), which allows me to suggest another 
reading of the above quotation from Pelevin: that the human is unknowable to the extent of 
absolute rational knowledge. This creates a need for an intuitive understanding that involves 
‘separation of matter from the mind’ and the resulting ‘dissolution of the self’. Thus, after the 
insights in the 4th jhana the characters from Tainye vidy achieve a state where they can 
separate matter from the mind and intuitively know that ‘все многообразие жизненных 
впечатлений сводится к набору физических стимулов и ментальных проекций’. As a 
result of this realization ‘“я есть” пропадает и гибнет’.227 The concept of no-self, applied to 
human and non-human forms, equates all matter, both sentient and non-sentient forms.  
Pelevin’s novel t offers a broader scope for interpretation of the concept of ‘thing-in-
itself’, placing it in the context of the inner path of revelatory self-contemplation. In his search 
for Optina Pustyn, an allegorical promised land of happiness and salvation, Count T. receives 
advice from the legendary enlightened figure, Solovev: ‘Ищите внутри себя’. 228  This 
sentence is a case of intertextuality, a cross-reference to Pelevin’s earlier novel that also 
focuses on the intuitive path: Chapaev i Pustota. Baron von Ungern explains how to find 
Inner Mongolia (which in that novel can be interpreted as an equivalent of Optina Pustyn): 
‘Увидьте самого себя’.229 It appears that man, in his intellectual search for the Truth, or 
 
226 Ibid., pp.184, 190. 
227 Ibid., pp.199, 203. 
228 Pelevin, t, p.350. 
229 Pelevin, Chapaev i Pustota, p.242. 
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meaning of life, should be targeting himself, studying his own nature, mind, feelings and 
sensations relative to the outside world; and at some point, if he succeeds in liberating himself 
from the grip of his passions and language-driven intellectual constructs, he might reach a 
moment of intuitive revelation about eternal existential questions: ‘Тут не изо рта надо 
отвечать. И не из головы’.230  
It appears that Chapaev i Pustota, t, and Tainye vidy all have references to this 
revelatory moment when the protagonists intuitively realise the transience of being, non-
duality (i.e. multiplicity) of the universe and all matter, and the absence of any individual 
unique self. In Pelevin’s novel these revelations of the protagonists are presented as some of 
the key insights of Buddhism.231 What is more relevant to our analysis is that the above 
concepts represent an ability to intuitively conceive of inherent but previously unnoticed 
aspects of reality and thus view the world through different perspectives simultaneously. In 
other words, the above insights allow for a heterogeneous perspective of the world in one 
individual. Such a perspective corresponds to what some philosophers and critical theorists of 
posthumanism maintain about the emergent ontology of the posthuman being. For example, 
Donna Haraway emphasises the multiple heterogeneous perspectives of the posthuman being, 
as opposed to a singular identity of an individual in the humanist context.232 It is important to 
remember that the multiple perspectives here are viewed not through the prism of intellect (as 
a contemporary ‘unenlightened’ individual is capable of understanding multiple views). They 
are seen as heterogeneous states experienced and intuited at the same time. As a result, 
drawing on the concepts mentioned above, such states might lead to empathy through 
realization of unity of all multiplicity of forms. 
In Pelevin’s narrative, multiplicity is illustrated not only by the variety of forms in the 
‘rainbow flow’ but also by the different transformative effects that protagonists’ revelations 
have, depending on an individual experiencing them. It means that multiplicity can also 
include the diversity of individual perceptions: ‘там, где мы только что были, все очень 
индивидуально. […] Все зависит от того, кто на это смотрит’ (see note 229). Thus, the 
oligarchs from Tainye vidy, having intuited the multiplicity-unity of life, transience of being, 
and nonexistence of the self, plunge into a life of greater suffering after their transformative 
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experience: ‘Плачу целыми днями… И ничего с этим не поделать. Все такое 
страшное...’233 
By contrast, Count T. from novel t, who is a book character that materialises into a real 
individual, realises his unity with the human world as a result of his intuitive revelations: ‘он 
[Ариель, создатель] и вся его банда существуют на равных правах с вами, мной и 
лавкой, на которой вы сидите. […] На самом деле, если разобраться, нет никакого меня, 
есть только он [создатель]. Но этот ‘он’ и есть я.’ The ending of the novel underlines the 
equanimity and empathy achieved by the protagonist - he is no longer surprised when his 
horse talks to him in his language. What is more, he marvels at the continuity of life by 
feeling an affinity with a tiny beetle: ‘Но странно вот что — это огромное солнце вместе 
со всем остальным в мире каким-то удивительным образом возникает и исчезает в 
крохотном существе, сидящем в потоке солнечного света’. As a result, he looks at all 
forms as equal agents in this duration of life: ‘А значит, невозможно сказать, что такое на 
самом деле эта букашка, это солнце, и этот бородатый человек в телеге […] — потому 
что любые слова будут глупостью, сном и ошибкой’. And this unity with the world cannot 
be effectively put into words, it can only be attained through intuition: ‘И всё это было ясно 
из движений четырёх лапок, из тихого шелеста ветра в траве, и даже из тишины, 
наступившей, когда ветер стих’.234 It appears, therefore, that a truly posthuman vision in 
this context implies an empathy achieved through a heterogeneous perspective of the 
universe. 
This perspective, resulting from an intuitive knowledge, redefines the nature of some 
underlying notions of human/posthuman existence that are addressed in Pelevin’s narrative 
and have striking parallels with the philosophies he engages with in his writing. A complex 
concept, most significantly affected by posthumanism, is that of ‘love’. In line with the 
disembodied condition of posthumanism as well as with the Buddhist spiritual understanding 
of love as universal empathy, the werefox from Sviashchennaia kniga oborotnia achieves an 
enlightened state through absolute love: ‘зародить в своей душе любовь, начиная с самых 
простых ее форм и постепенно поднимаясь к истинной любви, у которой нет ни 
субъекта, ни объекта’.235 In the context of no-self this kind of absolute love targets no one in 
particular and emanates from no one, therefore it is free from both personal subjectivity of an 
 
233 Pelevin, Tainye vidy, p.203. 
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individual and from the grip of mental constructs of the mind. Such an understanding of love 
can only be attained intuitively and is beyond comprehension at the previously discussed 
levels of sensual perception (instinct) or intellectual conception. In the context of 
posthumanist thought this interpretation corresponds to the platonic understanding of love as a 
feeling driven by compassion, empathy and equanimity. This kind of love exists as pre-
condition of existence in the posthuman world as it embraces human and non-human forms 
and is, in fact, disembodied in nature.  
A deeper analysis of Pelevin’s text in t offers an additional perspective on love that 
becomes apparent through his indirect reference to Solovev’s philosophy. One of the 
characters in the novel is called Vladimir Solovev and has a half-serious, half-comic role of a 
prophet and martyr guiding the protagonist. The allusion to Solovev’s understanding of love 
is made indirectly, from a general reference to his philosophical pursuits: 
 
А история Соловьёва, наоборот, должна была рассказать о духовной катастрофе, к которой 
тонкого философа и поэта привело увлечение восточным панмонголизмом и языческим 
неоплатонизмом, переросшее затем в неудержимую страсть к католичеству и 
завершившееся падением в тёмную бездну экуменизма.236  
 
In Solovev’s interpretation, love has an overarching role as it represents any inner unity – 
‘всякое внутреннее единство, всякое изнутри идущее соединение многих’. He goes on to 
draw a parallel between love and the universal good (‘благо есть единство всего или всех, 
т.е. любовь как желаемое’); truth (‘[и]стина есть та же любовь, т.е. единство всего, но 
уже как объективно представляемое: это есть единство идеальное’) and beauty  
(‘[н]аконец, красота есть та же любовь (т.е. единство всех), но как проявленная или 
ощутимая: это есть единство реальное’).237 This kind of love – manifesting itself through a 
unity of the good, truth and beauty – is only possible as a rejection of egocentrism:  
 
 
236 Pelevin, t, p.257. 






Познавая в любви истину другого не отвлеченно, а существенно, перенося на деле центр 
своей жизни за пределы своей эмпирической способности, мы тем самым проявляем и 
осуществляем свою собственную истину, свое безусловное значение, которое именно и 
состоит в способности переходить за границы своего фактического феноменального бытия, 
в способности жить не только в себе, но и в другом.238  
 
This metaphysical understanding of love resonates with the idea of no-self in Pelevin’s 
Buddhism-influenced narrative, which also correlates with the posthumanist philosophy of 
disembodiment and multiplicity of form (also see Bergson above): 
 
Смысл как раз в том, что какая-то пылинка, прах — оживает, осознаёт себя и доходит до 
самого неба. Таков путь вещей… В этом и должна проявиться небесная любовь. Кого ещё 
любить всемогущему небу, как не крохотную пылинку?239  
 
And further in the text: 
 
И [она дает ответ] зачем любить другого человека, когда тот страдает — это ведь 
безграничная вечность забыла себя, отчаялась и плачет.240 
 
The insights emerging from an intuitive perception of being and the world inextricably link 
the metaphysics of love (compassion, empathy and equanimity of all forms) with the notion of 
the ‘Absolute’, or ‘source of life’, or ‘God’ (the choice of terminology varies, and overlaps, in 
different philosophical and religious traditions). This multi-faceted notion is studied in our 
analysis as it is an integral part of Pelevin’s posthumanist narrative and also appears to be a 
focal theme in the general posthumanist philosophy of the twenty-first century. The 
interpretation of the concept of God in Pelevin’s works comes from his transhuman 
protagonists (werefox A-Huli, vampire Rama), characters who transcended the human 
limitations of conventional mind (book character Count T., ‘dynamic human God Levitan’) as 
well as from allusions and implicit references in the text. It has to be said, however, that all 
the textual evidence referring to God, as the author admits himself, is only a subjective 
attempt, distorted by language, to explain the elusive concept at the intellectual level:  
 
238 Ibid., Part III. 
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[…] объяснить человеку, что такое Бог, невозможно. Вернее, можно объяснить человеку 
концепцию Бога, и она станет частью его умственного багажа. Но это не значит, что человек 
познает Бога.241  
 
According to Pelevin’s protagonist Semen Levitan, who happens to conceive of God through 
his substance-induced God-like states, ‘Бога можно только непосредственно пережить’.242 
This view about conceiving of the nature of God resonates with the previously mentioned 
Bergson’s model of understanding reality, whereby impassable elusive notions can be only 
intuited, not perceived through senses or intellect. That is why in Pelevin’s works the use of 
the terms ‘soul, ‘God’, ‘consciousness’ is merely a pragmatic need to convey the essence of 
God in terms accessible to the reader, i.e. at the intellectual, rather than intuitive level. Again, 
this is the limitation imposed by the subjectivity of human language use.  
The first characteristic of what is referred to as God in Pelevin’s works is creativity, or 
causality. God, or Absolute, appears to be the primary source of all conscious minds; 
therefore it exists and is actualised in the human mind that it, God/Absolute, created: 
‘Сознание, которое человек считает своим — на самом деле сознание Бога’. 243  In 
philosophical terms, if God is represented in each individual consciousness, then the rule of 
multiplicity of representation makes this metaphysical entity a sum of all presences and all 
minds and, as such, explains the omnipresence and omniscience of God. Interestingly, this 
vision resonates with the concept of ‘Brahman’ in Advaita Vedanta, a classical school of 
Hindu philosophy that interacted with Buddhism and had some influence on it. In t, one of the 
controversial and elusive protagonists (who at first seems to have omnipotent power as the 
writer, i.e. the creator of all reality, and then is reduced to a cat in Count T’s reality) is called 
Ariel Edmundovich Brahman. The concept of ‘Brahman’ is understood to represent Absolute 
Reality that is the ‘primordial reality that creates, maintains and withdraws within it the 
universe’.244 Thus the concept of Brahman represents a ‘creative principle which lies realised 
in the whole world’.  
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This non-theistic vision of God as a source of all heterogeneous unity resonates with the 
concept of qualitative multiplicity. A qualitative multiplicity is seen by Bergson as 
heterogeneous, continuous (or interpenetrating), and progressive (or temporal, an irreversible 
flow of different clusters of matter in time). Bergson believed that because qualitative 
multiplicity is heterogeneous and at the same time interpenetrating, it cannot be adequately 
represented by a symbol, so it is inexpressible (see note 72). This vision corresponds to the 
words in Chapaev i Pustota – ‘“Бог” указывает на то, на что указать нельзя’.245 So the idea 
of God is also inexpressible, which is one of the possible interpretations of Pelevin’s master 
trope of ‘emptiness’, ‘nothingness’, ‘abyss’, or ‘void’.  
Understanding the idea of God, or original source of all being, is intertwined in 
Pelevin’s works with man’s free will. The author challenges the humanist understanding of 
man’s free will according to which man independently forms ideas and takes decisions. The 
author’s insights into the nature of ‘God’ at first might also be interpreted as an argument 
against man’s free will. If man’s mind was created by God then all man’s ideas also originate 
through God, and man’s mind becomes a mere container of ideas of the Other: ‘И вдруг я 
понял, что Бог — это единственная душа в мире, а все прочие создания есть лишь 
танцующие в ней механизмы, и Он лично наполняет Собой каждый из этих 
механизмов’.246 However, further analysis of these lines reveals a more complex perspective 
that can lead to an understanding of God, or Absolute, through empathetic love. The first step 
leading to this revelation is understanding unity with all matter through multiplicity of form. 
In other words, if God is the primordial creative impulse, then he is realised through its 
creations, therefore ‘Бог у каждого свой’247 and ‘личность у Абсолюта всё же есть’.248 
Sem’en Levitan in ‘Operatsiia “Burning Bush”’ realises: 
 
Я понял, что Бог принял форму тысячи разных сил, которые столкнулись друг с другом и 
сотворили меня — и я, Семен Левитан, со своей лысиной и очками, весь создан из Бога, и 
кроме Бога во мне ничего нет [.] (see note 246) 
 
This interpretation does not deny man’s will, it equates man and all living matter through this 
general original source: ‘Тот, кто пишет Книгу Жизни, и тот, кто читает её, и тот, о ком 
 
245 Pelevin, Chapaev i Pustota, p.176. 
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эта Книга рассказывает. И этот луч — я сам, потому что я не могу быть ничем иным. Я 
был им всегда и вечно им буду. Вы считаете, мне нужна какая-то ещё сила?’249 And in 
‘Operatsiia “Burning Bush”’, the imagery of light conveys the same message: ‘Как будто я 
летел за вихрем искр, и был одной из искр и всем вихрем, и смеялся и пел на разные 
голоса…’250 
It appears, therefore, that the rigid theistic conventions in which God was viewed by 
humanism are no longer relevant in the non-theistic posthumanist context that celebrates 
ultimate transcendence – liberation from all previous conventions: ‘[…] к Богу неприменима 
низменная человеческая категория господства. […] Богу не присуща никакая власть. 
[…] Бог есть свобода’. 251  The liberation arises from the realization of this unity of 
multiplicities and results in empathy and acceptance of all form as the self becomes an 
integral part of it: ‘это, неописуемое, превосходящее любую попытку даже связно думать 
— и есть Бог, и когда Он хочет, Он берет тебя на эту высоту из заколдованного мира, и 
ты видишь все ясно и без сомнений, и ты и Он — одно’ (see note 251). This 
understanding of unity with God and the world is reiterated more metaphorically in another 
novel, t, which contains references to Tolstoy’s philosophical ideas that seem to be 
remarkably in line with the above concept of multiple unity:  
 
Перед ним возникла знакомая тьма, полная невидимого света, который давал о себе знать 
множеством неуловимых отблесков. […] Т. подумал, что это и есть единственный образ 
Божий, действительно данный свыше, потому что каждый человек с младенчества носит его 
с собой. И там, если смотреть внимательно, есть все ответы на все вопросы.252 
 
Thus, as the above analysis suggests, the ‘clear, undoubted truth’ which the protagonists intuit 
in Pelevin’s worlds through compassion and affinity represents universal absolute love 
without an object or subject, omnipotent and omnipresent, as A-Huli from Sviashchennaia 
kniga oborotnia realises in her revelation. In ‘Operatsiia “Burning Bush”’ this insight is 
extended to the notion of God, which is explicitly mentioned: 
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[…] и если это не высшая любовь, какая только может быть, то что же тогда любовь? […] 
вся эта дикая кутерьма, на которую мы всю жизнь жалуемся себе и друг другу, существует 
только для того, чтобы могла воплотиться непостижимая, прекрасная, удивительная, ни на 
что не похожая любовь — про которую нельзя даже сказать, кто ее субъект и объект, потому 
что, если попытаешься проследить ее конец и начало, поймешь, что ничего кроме нее на 
самом деле нет, и сам ты и она — одно и то же. (see note 251) 
 
t, a novel about Count T(olstoy), makes direct references to Russian nineteenth-century 
metaphysics, in particular the definitions of God and God-like qualities by Leo Tolstoy, 
whose views are artistically interpreted in the novel. As Tolstoy wrote in one of his letters in 
1908: ‘Для меня метафизическая основа всего есть сознание отделенности каждого из 
нас: мы сознаем себя отдельными проявлениями Бога’.253  This view in early Tolstoy 
develops into a vision outlined in ‘Ispoved’: ‘Что такое я? Часть бесконечного. Ведь уже в 
этих двух словах лежит вся задача’.254 The understanding of the idea of God in t (outlined 
above) seems to echo Tolstoy’s lines from ‘Put Zhizni’: ‘Душа человеческая, будучи 
отделена телом от Бога и душ других существ, стремится к соединению с тем, от чего 
она отделена. Соединяется душа с Богом все большим и большим сознанием в себе 
Бога, с душами же других существ - все большим и большим проявлением любви’.255 
Therefore love becomes an aspiration, a will, movement of the human soul to unite with the 
soul of God and souls of other beings: ‘Сказано: Бог есть любовь; надо же сказать: любовь 
есть Бог. Впрочем, и Бог есть любовь (т. е. Бога мы знаем только в виде любви), и 
любовь есть Бог (т. е. если мы любим, то становимся подобными Богу)’.256 
It follows from the above analysis of the concepts of God and love in Pelevin’s 
narrative that love is an essential condition of, and at the same time a result of, knowing God. 
But more importantly for the posthumanist discourse that focuses on transcendence, absolute 
love – without the subject or object - is a God-like quality. In other words, it is a form of 
transcendence of human limitations that makes man similar to God. In Pelevin’s works: ‘и ты 
и Он [Бог] — одно’, ‘сам ты и она [любовь] — одно и то же’;257 According to Tolstoy: 
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‘если мы любим, то становимся подобными Богу’.258 However, the traditional view of the 
concept of ‘богочеловек’ - God-like human (or being, in the posthumanist context) – would 
be alien to Pelevin’s philosophy as it implies supremacy of one specific individual over 
others. But the essence of the enlightened state, according to Pelevin’s characters, is the 
intuitive realization of unity with all there is through unity with God, or Absolute, as the 
source of continuous life. To a certain extent, such an understanding of God changes the 
semantics of the concept and, as a result, resonates with the twenty-first-century concept of 
‘posthuman god’ that is also devoid of divine meaning. 259 It implies the sophistication and 
unfathomable intelligence of the posthuman being in the future to such an extent that his 
behavior would possibly be incomprehensible to today’s human beings because of their 
artificially limited experience, knowledge and intelligence.  
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The above analysis attempted a reading of Pelevin’s oeuvre as a heterogeneous multiplicity of 
dynamic literary form approached from the posthumanist perspective. This conclusion will 
address the main points of the author’s posthumanist stance that follow from the analysis and 
look at them relative to a number of most resonant contemporary transhumanist visions. The 
purpose of such an approach is to identify the key areas in the imminent transhuman condition 
of mankind that need to be studied carefully to ensure a truly posthuman future and to avoid 
the threats of transhumanism that can lead to a doomsday scenario.  
The first point about Pelevin’s posthumanist position that transpires from his literary 
work is that he is not a proponent of transhumanism as a mere tool of human enhancement. 
His books expose human weakness, vanity and greed, against the background of his 
protagonists’ journeys of self-exploration. Such a society can only use transhumanist 
possibilities in the same way as all previous innovations – to serve the political and economic 
needs of the elite or to pamper the vanity of the consumer. Here is a possible dystopian 
scenario described in S.N.U.F.F.: 
 
Первоначально офшары были свободной от налогов экстерриториальной зоной, где не 
действовало наземное право. […] Постепенно туда переместилась киноиндустрия, наука и 
финансы — сбылась наконец давняя мечта банкиров всей Земли об офшорном эмиссионном 
банке. Офшары стали превращаться в огромные летающие города, где жила элита 
человечества, не боясь, что туда ворвется толпа “оккупантов” со своими палатками, 
громкоговорителями и революционными плакатами.260  
 
Similarly, in iPhuck10, Porfirii’s antagonist Mara uses him (an AI) and other state-of-the-art 
gadgetry for her illegal, mercenary goals – hacking digital information about pieces of art to 
‘deep fake’ them in pornfilms. In Tainye vidy Russian oligarchs use ‘эмо-пантограф’, a 
special head-set operated through the meditative states of Buddhist monks, to extract the 
information from their insights in the jhanas for material gain:  
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Помните, он говорил, что в четвертой джане можно так аккуратно заглядывать во всякие 
вопросы. В общем, он не только говорил, но и делал, причем с самого начала. Помните, 
биток шесть тысяч стоил? Юрий Соломонович тогда серьезно так вложился. А когда он до 
восемнадцати поднялся, Юрий Соломонович постиг из четвертой джаны, что дальше он 
вниз пойдет. И все продал.261  
 
The object of criticism in Pelevin’s books, therefore, is not transhumanism per se, nor is it 
human nature, it is contemporary society in general. This view can be inferred from the 
versatile settings in his books that bitterly mock the shallow societal conventions and values. 
The setting can change: from a suburban Moscow forest of the 90s (‘Problema vervolka’) to a 
mind-boggling advanced media and AI-controlled global state (S.N.U.F.F.); from 
contemporary glamourous image-obsessed capital city (Ampir V) to the digital vacuum of an 
artificial mind (iPhuck10). But humans remain the same – vain, scared, confused, and 
submissive – because of the workings of the mind and the physical needs and desires.  
Human vices versus human nature is a crucial point in this argument. Pelevin is often 
accused of being too ironic and even offensive in his sweeping criticism. Basinskii’s review 
of Chapaev i Pustota can be a common formula for such negative comments: ‘произведение, 
насыщенное неумными, а главное совершенно не мотивированными гадостями’ (see 
note 69). Such an approach to his writing apparently stems from misunderstanding the thrust 
of Pelevin’s message. For example, what Basinskii infers from Generation П is, on the 
contrary, the object of targeted criticism of prevalent values and contemporary stock types:  
 
Пелевин излагает целую программу для поколения "новых людей". Быть нормальным 
циником. Не доверять миру, который обманчив во всех своих проявлениях. Доверять только 
собственным ощущениям. Но если тебе от них кайфово, то и ладно. Эдакий агностицизм, 
переходящий в эмпиризм, и своего рода разумный эгоизм. Все ложь и обман. Но именно 
поэтому в жизни можно устроиться весьма недурно.’262  
 
For some reason, the critic understood it as ‘guidelines’ from the author, but in fact 
Generation П is a satirical portrayal of the generation, with the protagonist Tatarskii, sadly, 
succumbing to the temptations despite an opportunity to rise above them. Even though the 
ending of the novel (quoted in Chapter 2) allows for a variety of interpretations, a later novel, 
 
261 Pelevin, Tainye vidy, p.170. 
262 Pavel Basinskii, ‘Sindrom Pelevina’, Literaturnaia gazeta, 45, 12 May 1999, p.11. 
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Ampir V, dispels any remaining hope for Tatarskii. It turns out that his privileged position of 
the ‘mortal husband of the goddess’ involves working for the elite (the vampires who rule the 
world). And besides, even this position was a result of a mistake: 
  
Результат гадания как раз всегда ясный, - перебил Мардук Семенович. - Это в головах 
туман. Выпало, что новым мужем богини должен быть человек с именем города. А у 
Татарского редкое имя - Вавилен. Ну и решили, что это он, потому что на "Вавилон" 
похоже… Может и похоже. Но ведь, строго говоря, такого города нет. В результате очень 
серьезного человека оставили в пролете. Который по всем параметрам подходил.263 
 
This example illustrates the author’s position on the generation ruled by ‘креативщики’, 
‘дискурсмонгеры’, ‘олигархи’ who, in his view, are all ‘халдеи’. He uses the name of 
Chaldeans, an ancient tribe that briefly ruled Babylon, because in Russian it developed a 
derogatory meaning of ‘человек, вызывающий возмущение своей подобострастностью, 
угодливостью.’264 It is this kind of society that presents a risk to true posthumanism.  
It might seem at first that Pelevin’s skeptical portrayal of contemporary beliefs and 
values represents a strong rejection of transhumanism. After all, it would be in line with a 
wide range of negative messages accompanying contemporary transhumanist discourse. The 
political scientist Fukuyama, for example, warns that unforeseen threats of biotechnological 
advances can undermine the ‘natural standards for right and wrong’.265 According to him, 
human enhancement, in particular genetic engineering, can change human nature and thus 
shift the existing balance of the ‘inviolability of human dignity’, which will wreak havoc on 
humanity. This position makes him a staunch supporter of preserving human nature: 
humaneness is ‘the very grounding of the human moral sense, which has been a constant ever 
since we were human beings.’266  
However, there is an apparent difference between the approaches of Fukuyama and 
Pelevin. Fukuyama treats human nature as a cradle of humaneness, as a measure of right and 
wrong, a benchmark for justice in a democracy. Pelevin, on the contrary, shows throughout 
his works that in reality these boundaries have blurred today, hollowing out the essence of this 
 
263 Pelevin, Ampir V, p.180. 
264 Bolshoi tolkovyi slovar russkogo iazyka, 1st ed. by Sergei A. Kuznetsov, (St.Petersburg: Norint, 1998).  




classical humanist vision. This is why I can argue that he does not target transhumanism as a 
concept in his criticism but rather thinks it premature in contemporary society. To him 
transhumanism can only be meaningful and lead to a truly posthumanist all-inclusive society 
after humanity transcends its limiting anthropocentric conventions and weaknesses. 
Achieving this will lead to an emergence of a new vision that will allow to use biotechnology 
and science for the benefit of all forms of life.  
Pelevin, therefore, does not rule out the possibility of a transformation for an individual; 
he tries to show this path of liberation, embarking on which one can rise above his or her 
weaknesses. A-Huli and Count T. are examples of this possibility. And intuition is the way to 
grasp the truth of life: ‘И все то, что я пытаюсь сейчас описать, понимаешь […] за долю 
секунды, даже не думая – просто как бы получаешь доступ к этому ментальному 
чертежу’.267 Bogdanova gives a similar interpretation of Pelevin’s vision:  
 
[…] Пелевин не приемлет отрицания некой позитивной сущности человека, внутренней 
психологической осмысленности субъекта (будь то человек, животное, насекомое, растение, 
солнечный луч или пылинка).268 
 
Bogdanova’s interpretation treats this ‘positive essence’ of a human being in Pelevin’s works 
as a feature common to all other living matter, as seen in the above quotation. Such a view 
appears to stem from Pelevin’s vision of life as a flux in duration that was discussed above 
relative to the corresponding image of ‘élan vital’ in Bergson. This reading of Pelevin’s 
posthumanism resonates with the views of critical posthumanists, such as Braidotti who 
believes in the benefits of a changed position of the human species brought about by the 
techno-scientific advance. She maintains it will lead to an evolution in our thinking and a 
truly posthuman society will be ‘built not on fear, anxiety, and shared vulnerability but rather 
on discovering new empowering relations and activities’.269 Similarly, Haraway’s ‘A Cyborg 
Manifesto’ celebrates ‘social and bodily realities in which people are not afraid of their joint 
 
267 Pelevin, Tainye vidy, p.173. 
268 Olga V. Bogdanova, ‘Sovremennyi literaturnyi protsess (K voprosu o postmodernizme v russkoi literature 
70-90-kh godov XX veka): materialy k kursu ‘Istoria literatury XX veka (chast III)’ (St.Petersburg, 2001), 
pp.99-100.  
269 Rosi Braidotti, The Posthuman (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), p.195. 
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kinship with animals and machines, not afraid of permanently partial identities and 
contradictory standpoints’.270  
Of course, mankind is yet to achieve the level of scientific advance that would make the 
above doomsday or optimistic scenarios possible. But Pelevin’s books - with their deliberately 
unconventional style, unabashed criticism, and recurring Buddhist-informed messages - offer 
humanity ample material for an introspective analysis that might elucidate a vision that could 
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